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THE PENUMBRAL PUBLIC DOMAIN:  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
ON QUASI-COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 
Aaron K. Perzanowski* 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s authority to establish copyright laws, like every grant of 
legislative authority, contains limits on the scope of federal power.  
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides Congress with the authority to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.”1  In broad terms, the limits inher-
ent in Clause 8 divide into two categories:  limits on the sorts of works 
in which Congress can grant exclusive rights and limits on the types 
of exclusive rights that Congress can use to protect those works.  The 
outer edges of this power, at least as much as any other legislative 
grant, were “defined, and limited . . . [so] that those limits may not be 
mistaken, or forgotten.”2 
 
  © 2008 Aaron K. Perzanowski.  The author hereby permits the use of this Article under 
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States license, the full terms of 
which are available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/legalcode. 
 * Microsoft Research Fellow, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, UC Berkeley School 
of Law.  Thanks to Brian W. Carver, Deirdre Mulligan, Amy Rodriguez, Pam Samuelson, 
and Fred von Lohmann for their comments on earlier drafts. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Scholars have referred to this clause by a number of names:  
the “Intellectual Property Clause,” Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property 
Clause:  Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1771, 1771 (2006); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful 
Arts:  The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1 (1994); the “Patent and Copyright Clause,” Robert P. 
Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:  Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 2187, 2208 (2000); Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by § 103 
of the 1952 Patent Act, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 147, 150 (2004); the “Progress Clause,” Malla Pol-
lack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?:  Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 754 
(2001); and the “Exclusive Rights Clause,” Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass:  Alice 
and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 173, 
175 (2003).  Rather than adopt any of these terms, many of which suggest some ideologi-
cal bias, this Article refers to “Clause 8.” 
 2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); see 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW 
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486 
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But Congress has other powers—chief among them, its authority 
to regulate interstate commerce—that could allow it to undermine 
the limits of Clause 8.  The breadth of the modern Commerce 
Clause3 provides Congress with authority over subject matter once 
squarely and exclusively within the domain of Clause 8.  Unre-
strained, this independent commerce power could permit Congress 
to ignore the limits on its copyright authority. 
This Article aims to achieve two objectives.  First, recognizing that 
courts have not yet done so, it outlines a general approach to identi-
fying and resolving inter-clause conflicts.  Second, it applies that gen-
eral framework to the copyright power of Clause 8 in order to define 
the scope of constitutional prohibitions against quasi-copyright pro-
tections.4 
This Article argues that the limits of Clause 8 apply any time Con-
gress attempts to legislate within the core subject matter of its copy-
right power—grants of exclusive rights in expression.  Unless the lim-
its of Clause 8 cabin the commerce power, those limits are effectively 
stricken from the Constitution, despite the Framers’ best efforts to 
ensure that they could not be ignored. 
Once the limits of Clause 8 are understood to apply regardless of 
the power Congress recites, a public domain or component thereof5 
firmly and permanently rooted in the Constitution emerges.6  This 
 
(1953) (“Reading the [Clause 8] power, then, in light of the statute of Anne and the then 
recent decisions of the English courts, it is clear that this power of Congress was enumer-
ated in the Constitution, for the purpose of expressing its limitations.”). 
 3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 4 The scope of this Article is limited to the copyright power of Clause 8, but the general 
principles and some of the limits addressed are equally applicable to the patent power. 
 5 The term “public domain” is used to refer to a number of distinct but overlapping con-
cepts.  See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching 
Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006).  To the extent a single public do-
main exists, it comprises some or all of these interrelated components. 
 6 This Article is not the first to suggest that limits inherent in the Constitution give rise to a 
mandatory public domain.  See Benkler, supra note 1 at 201; Robert Patrick Merges & 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Essay, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 45, 52–53 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right To Have Some-
thing To Say?  One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 313–15 (2004).  Nor 
is it the first to argue that specific classes of works are beyond the constitutional scope of 
Clause 8 authority.  See generally, Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protec-
tion:  The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539–49 (2000); Michael Birnhack, More or Better?  Shaping the 
Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie 
Guibault eds., 2005); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative 
Power:  The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1119 (2000); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:  An 
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public domain, defined by the limits of Clause 8, includes unoriginal 
and unwritten expressive works.  These two classes of works, as a con-
stitutional matter, cannot be the subject of federal grants of exclusive 
rights. 
Part I examines the source of inter-clause conflicts and suggests 
that they are primarily a result of the expansion of Congress’s com-
merce authority.  Prior to this expansion, Congress’s enumerated 
powers each occupied distinct zones of authority that were infre-
quently invaded by other clauses.  The limits of one clause rarely con-
flicted with the power granted under another.  Since inter-clause con-
flicts were unanticipated, the Framers neglected to specify whether 
the limits in one clause could restrain another.  The Court has strug-
gled with this ambiguity on the few occasions it has considered inter-
clause conflict, and no generally applicable approach has emerged 
from the Court’s efforts. 
Part II outlines such an approach.  Its starting point is the canon 
of construction that rejects readings of documents that render text 
superfluous.  If the limits of Clause 8 and Congress’s other enumer-
ated powers cannot restrict legislation otherwise justified under the 
commerce power, those limits will be all but erased from the Consti-
tution.  In order to avoid undue restraints on congressional authority, 
this approach requires the sepraration of genuine external limits 
from mere descriptions of the scope of a particular power.  This sepa-
ration, in turn, relies on a comparative analysis that considers each 
enumerated power in the broader context of Congress’s legislative 
authority as a whole. 
After identifying the potential limits on Congress’s copyright au-
thority, Part III applies this general approach to Clause 8.  This Part 
isolates the core subject matter of Congress’s copyright authority—
the power to grant exclusive rights in expression.  Because no other 
enumerated powers permit Congress to grant such rights, the limits 
of Clause 8 restrain Congress any time it seeks to confer exclusive 
rights in expressive works regardless of the power under which it at-
tempts to act.  Applied externally, the limits of Clause 8 define both a 
set of exclusive rights and a set of expressive works beyond the reach 
of Congress—the penumbral public domain. 
 
Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999); Malla Pollack, Uncon-
stitutional Incontestability?  The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of 
the Constitution:  Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
259 (1995). 
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Part IV examines existing and proposed legislation that invades 
the penumbral public domain by granting exclusive rights that ignore 
the limits on Congress’s positive authority.  In particular, this Part 
addresses the federal anti-bootlegging statutes, which protect live mu-
sical performances from unauthorized recordings ostensibly under 
the Commerce Clause.  Despite the Second Circuit’s recent decision 
in United States v. Martignon upholding the constitutionality of the sta-
tutes,7 they fall within the ambit of Clause 8 and must adhere to its 
limits. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF INTER-CLAUSE CONFLICT 
In 1994, when Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act (“URAA”),8 it faced a dilemma.  The URAA implemented the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”).9  TRIPS, in part, called for copyright-like protections for 
unfixed live performances for a term of at least fifty years.10  The 
United States—the chief architect and proponent of TRIPS11—
encountered a significant hurdle in implementing these protections, 
namely that Congress’s copyright authority under Clause 8 permits 
exclusive rights only in “Writings.”  Since unfixed live performances 
do not qualify as “Writings,”12 the protections required by TRIPS and 
embodied in the URAA were impermissible under Congress’s Clause 
8 power. 
Despite the limits inherent in Clause 8, Congress enacted the 
URAA, creating two statutes, § 1101 of Title 17 and § 2319A of Title 
18 of the United States Code, that impose civil and criminal penalties 
for copyright infringement on those who record, reproduce, and dis-
tribute unauthorized recordings of live musical performances.13  Not 
 
 7 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 8 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 9 See id. § 101(d)(15), § 315.  TRIPS was a component of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”).  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Nego-
tiations (the Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 87. 
 10 Id. at 83. 
 11 United States Submits TRIPS Proposal to GATT, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 
981, at 72–73 (May 17, 1990). 
 12 See infra Part III.A.4. 
 13 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000) (“Unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and 
music videos”); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000) (“Unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in 
sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances”).  One may ask why 
protection above and beyond that already provided by the Copyright Act is necessary for 
live performances.  The composer of the work performed, to the extent the composition 
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only do the statutes extend copyright-like protections to non-writings, 
but those protections are perpetual, in direct conflict with the limited 
times requirement of Clause 8.14 
When these anti-bootlegging statutes were inevitably challenged as 
improper exercises of Congress’s Clause 8 authority, the United 
States defended them on the grounds that the statutes reflected the 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  According to the 
United States, as regulations of interstate commerce, the statutes 
were immune from the limitations that restrict traditional copyright 
laws. 
In the first of these cases, United States v. Moghadam,15 the Eleventh 
Circuit considered an appeal to a conviction under § 2319A.  In ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of the statute, the court assumed arguendo 
that § 2319A violated the limits of Clause 8 by protecting unwritten 
live performances.16  However, the court recognized that the Com-
merce Clause offered an alternative source of legislative power since 
unauthorized recordings substantially affect interstate commerce.17  
Because § 2319A was impermissible under Clause 8, but seemingly 
within the scope of Congress’s commerce authority, the constitution-
ality of the statute turned on the resolution of this inter-clause con-
flict.  In short, could Congress avoid the limits of Clause 8 by acting 
under the commerce power? 
According to the court, statutes justified as regulations of com-
merce are bound by the limits of Clause 8 only to the extent the stat-
 
was fixed prior to performance, possesses a copyright that can be asserted against an un-
authorized recordist.  However, bootleg producers could utilize the mechanical license 
provided by § 115 of the Copyright Act to satisfy the composer’s interest.  17 U.S.C. § 115 
(2000).  But the performer, who may own no interest in the composition, possesses no in-
terest in the performance itself under traditional copyright law.  Even if the performer 
records her performance in real time, an unauthorized recordist arguably does not in-
fringe the subsequent copyright that the performer enjoys in her own recording.  The 
performer’s recording was not fixed at the time of the unauthorized recording, and the 
two were independently created.  Therefore, at the time the URAA was adopted, a per-
former had no assertable interest in her performance qua performance under federal 
law. 
 14 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (providing civil remedies for the unauthorized use, com-
munication, or distribution of sound recordings and music videos of live musical per-
formances without establishing any time limit for protection); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) 
(2000) (providing criminal penalties for the unauthorized use, communication, or distri-
bution of sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances without estab-
lishing any time limit for protection). 
 15 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 16 Id. at 1274. 
 17 Id. at 1276. 
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utes are “fundamentally inconsistent with” those limits.18  Sec-
tion 2319A, according to the court, was “in no way inconsistent with 
the Copyright Clause . . . . Quite the contrary, extending such protec-
tion actually complements and is in harmony with the existing 
scheme that Congress has set up under the Copyright Clause.”19  In 
the court’s view, since granting exclusive rights in non-writings does 
not fundamentally conflict with the objectives of Clause 8, § 2319A 
was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority.20  However, the 
court intimated on three occasions that, had the issue of the perpet-
ual duration of the statute been properly raised, it would have held 
that the limited times requirement imposed an enforceable limit on 
the Commerce Clause.21 
Moghadam’s fundamental inconsistency test is problematic.  It 
suggests that certain limits on Congress’s constitutional authority, like 
the writings requirement of Clause 8, can be ignored if Congress so 
decides.  Other limits, like the limited times requirement, cannot be 
disregarded because their violation would result in a fundamental in-
consistency with the purposes of other enumerated powers.  But Mog-
hadam offers little justification for this distinction; nor does it articu-
late any method by which future courts can separate genuine limits 
from disposable ones. 
Not surprisingly, the next court to address § 2319A declined to 
adopt Moghadam’s reasoning.  In United States v. Martignon, the pro-
prietor of a retail record shop was charged with “selling unauthorized 
recordings of live performances by certain musical artists.”22  Mar-
tignon, having learned from Moghadam’s mistake, argued that the 
 
 18 Id. at 1281. 
 19 Id. at 1280. 
 20 Id. at 1282.  Moghadam suffered from an incomplete understanding of the purpose of 
Clause 8.  The court assumed that any expansion of Congress’s ability to grant exclusive 
rights in expression is consistent with the objective of Clause 8.  See id. at 1280–82.  This 
position assumes that the protection of creative works is the ultimate aim of  Clause 8 and 
not merely an instrumental goal.  The Framers sought to create a system of incentives for 
the creation, distribution, and eventual use of expressive works—a goal that relied not 
only on grants of rights, but also on the careful circumscribing of the bounds of that pro-
tection.  See infra Part III.  The court’s inability to recognize the constitutional role of the 
limits of Clause 8 led it to conclude that violations of the writings requirement could be 
reconciled with the Framers’ objectives.  Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280. 
 21 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 n.9, 1281 n.15, 1282 n.17.  The court refused to consider 
Moghadam’s limited times argument because it was raised for the first time in his reply 
brief.  Id. at 1281 n.15. 
 22 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
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statute violated both the writings and limited times requirements of 
Clause 8.23 
The Martignon district court analyzed the constitutionality of the 
statute not by asking whether it was fundamentally inconsistent with 
the objectives of Clause 8, but by asking whether, at its core, § 2319A 
was “a copyright law or a commercial regulation.”24  The court con-
sidered a number of factors, some of which—the actual and intended 
effects of the statute, for example—offered valuable insight into the 
statute’s nature; other factors, like the fact that § 2319A was codified 
in close proximity to the criminal copyright infringement statute, 
provided less convincing reasons to treat § 2319A as a copyright law 
for constitutional purposes.25  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
even if § 2319A was not a copyright law, it was so “copyright-like” that 
it must be bound by the limits of Clause 8.26  Because it violated those 
limits, the statute was held unconstitutional.27 
But the court’s failure to draw any explicit distinction between 
copyright laws and their copyright-like counterparts, and the absence 
of any transparent basis for classifying § 2319A as the latter, render its 
reasoning little more satisfying than Moghadam’s fundamental incon-
sistency test.  Indeed, as discussed infra, the Second Circuit over-
turned the district court’s holding in Martignon and adopted yet an-
other ultimately flawed analysis of the inter-clause conflict created by 
the anti-bootlegging statutes.28 
Beyond illustrating the specific tension between Congress’s com-
merce authority and limits inherent in Clause 8, Moghadam and Mar-
tignon encapsulate the broader question at the heart of all inter-
clause conflict:  When Congress faces a barrier to legislative action, 
may it act under an alternative source of authority to achieve an aim 
foreclosed by another enumerated power? 
 
 23 Id. at 416–17. 
 24 Id. at 419. 
 25  See  id. at 420–422.  
 26 Id. at 422. 
 27 Id. at 428.  The treatment of the civil anti-bootlegging statute under § 1101 further un-
derscores the confusion facing courts over inter-clause conflict.  In KISS Catalog I, the dis-
trict court explicitly adopted Martignon’s rationale and held § 1101 unconstitutional.  See 
KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (KISS Catalog I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 
2004).  However, after the death of the original presiding judge and the intervention of 
the United States, the court, on a motion for reconsideration, vacated the prior order.  
See KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods.(KISS Catalog II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005).  Kiss Catalog II likewise rejected Moghadam’s fundamental inconsistency test, 
maintaining that the Commerce Clause and Clause 8 were entirely independent sources 
of authority.  Id. at 1173–76. 
 28 See infra Part IV.D.    
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Likewise, these two cases demonstrate that courts faced with inter-
clause conflict often struggle to make sense of the relationships be-
tween grants of legislative authority.  This confusion results, in part, 
from the inherent ambiguity of the text of Article I, Section 8.  The 
limits contained within each enumerated power do not require, on 
their face, that Congress yield to those limits when acting pursuant to 
other legislative powers.  This Part begins by exploring the ambiguity 
of limits on Congress’s legislative authority and the Supreme Court’s 
failure to offer the guidance necessary to resolve it.  This Part con-
cludes by examining the primary source of inter-clause conflict, the 
expansion of the Commerce Clause. 
A.  Internal and External Application of Constitutional Limits 
Two propositions illustrate the inherent difficulty in resolving 
conflicts between constitutional grants of legislative authority.  First, 
because the legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution are 
cumulative, “what cannot be done under one of them may very well 
be doable under another.”29  Second, and equally true, Congress may 
not circumvent the limits imposed by one provision of the Constitu-
tion simply by acting under another grant of authority.30  These two 
propositions, although seemingly at odds, are in fact complimentary.  
In isolation, neither fully accounts for the complex interactions be-
tween the provisions of Article I, Section 8, but taken together, they 
explain that Congress is free to legislate under any sufficient constitu-
tional grant, so long as it does not contravene applicable limitations 
elsewhere in the Constitution. 
But determining whether a limit constrains other grants of au-
thority is not always an easy task.  Some limiting language functions 
purely descriptively.  Since Congress’s legislative powers are cumula-
tive, these internal limits outline the scope of a particular enumer-
ated power without constraining other grants of authority.  Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 10, for example, provides Congress authority to “de-
fine and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”31  
As a matter of textual interpretation, one would reasonably read the 
phrase “committed on the high Seas” as a characterization of the 
scope of the power granted under this clause—one that imposes no 
 
 29 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 30 See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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constraints on Congress’s ability to punish felonies committed on 
land under other grants of authority. 
But other limits in the Constitution undoubtedly function pro-
scriptively.  These limits not only apply to the provision within which 
they are situated, but also externally constrain Congress’s power un-
der other grants of authority.  The First Amendment serves as an ob-
vious instance of a constitutional provision that extends to all enu-
merated powers.32  Congress, for example, could not disregard the 
First Amendment by punishing seditious speech uttered on the high 
seas, despite its power under Clause 10. 
Some external limits are easily identified.  The requirement that 
“Congress shall make no law” expressly constrains congressional au-
thority regardless of its source.33  But most limitations in the Constitu-
tion are not expressed in such categorical terms.  These limits more 
closely resemble the language confining congressional authority un-
der Clause 10 to felonies and piracies “on the high Seas.”34  Nothing 
inherent in such text demands external application.  The limits of 
Clause 8, for example, with the potential exception of its “promote 
the Progress” language, appear textually indistinguishable from other 
potentially descriptive limits in Article I. 
The meaning of the Constitution, of course, is not always self-
evident.  Traditionally, we rely on the courts, particularly the Su-
preme Court, to provide the interpretative guidance needed to re-
solve these ambiguities.  However, the Court’s limited treatment of 
inter-clause conflict raises more questions than it answers. 
B.  The Supreme Court and Inter-Clause Conflict 
The Supreme Court has had few opportunities to consider poten-
tial conflicts between the authority conferred by one enumerated 
power and the limits imposed by another.  The few cases addressing 
inter-clause conflicts fail to offer a consistent, generalizable method 
for recognizing and resolving them.  Nonetheless, the Court has 
demonstrated a general receptiveness to the notion that the limits of 
one enumerated power may, under appropriate circumstances, re-
strain Congress from acting under an alternative source of authority. 
 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 33 Id.  The prohibitions against titles of nobility, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws of-
fer some additional examples of express external constraints.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cls. 3, 8. 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons offers the Court’s clearest 
treatment of inter-clause conflict.35  There, the Court held that a limit 
in the Bankruptcy Clause36 invalidated legislation otherwise permissi-
ble under the Commerce Clause.37  In 1975, the Chicago, Rock Island 
and Pacific Railroad Company (“Rock Island”) sought bankruptcy 
protection.38  Four years later, the company ceased operations, and 
the reorganization court ordered the liquidation of Rock Island’s as-
sets.39  In response, Congress enacted the Rock Island Railroad Tran-
sition and Employee Assistance Act (“RITA”)40 to ensure that former 
Rock Island employees received $75 million in benefits from the 
Rock Island estate.41 
Gibbons, Rock Island’s trustee, sought to have RITA declared un-
constitutional as a non-uniform, and thus invalid, exercise of the 
Bankruptcy Clause.42  Appellants, along with the United States, con-
tended that RITA was authorized as an exercise of Commerce Clause 
authority, and thus not subject to the uniformity requirement of the 
Bankruptcy Clause.43 
Railway Labor presented two questions to the Court:  first, whether 
RITA was subject to the uniformity requirement, and second, wheth-
er RITA satisfied that requirement.  In determining whether RITA 
was “an exercise of Congress’[s] power under the Bankruptcy 
Clause . . . or under the Commerce Clause,” the Court noted the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing between bankruptcy and commerce.44  Since 
RITA directly addressed the subject matter of bankruptcy law by “pre-
scrib[ing] the manner in which the property of the Rock Island estate 
 
 35  455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 36  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (providing Congress with the power to “establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
 37 Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 473. 
 38  Id. at 459. 
 39 Id. at 460. 
 40 Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.). 
 41 Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 462. 
 42 Id. at 463.  
 43 Id.;  see also Brief for Appellant at 20, 32–36, Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. 457 (Nos. 80-415, 80-
1239), 1981 WL 390393; Brief for the Federal Appellees at 23, Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. 457 
(Nos. 80-415, 80-1239) 1981 WL 390396. 
 44 Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465.  In furtherance of this point, the Court quoted James Madi-
son’s observation that “[t]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so inti-
mately connected with the regulation of commerce,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 285 
(James Madison) (N.Y. Heritage Press, 1945), and cited Sturges v. Crowninshield in a paren-
thetical quote:  “The bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of com-
merce . . . .”  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819).  Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465–66. 
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[was] to be distributed among its creditors,”45 the Court held that 
RITA functioned as a bankruptcy law and was subject to the uniform-
ity requirement.46  But because the Act targeted only the creditors 
and employees of Rock Island, the Court determined that RITA 
served as “nothing more than a private bill,” and thus lacked uni-
formity.47 
The Commerce Clause presented a seemingly independent and 
sufficient justification for RITA’s regulation of an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce.  But because the subject matter of RITA en-
croached upon the domain of the Bankruptcy Clause, the uniformity 
requirement precluded the Act, despite the apparent sufficiency of 
the commerce power. 
Railway Labor is the most frequently cited case restraining Con-
gress from acting under one power on the basis of a limit inherent in 
another.48  But it is arguably not the only one.49  In Perry v. United 
 
 45  Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 467. 
 46 See id. at 467–69. 
 47 Id. at 471. 
 48 One opponent of external application of Clause 8 limitations attempts to explain away 
Railway Labor as the product of an unstated parallel drawn by the Court to the express li-
mitations of the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  See Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 314–16 (2004).  Arti-
cle I, Section 10, Clause 1 precludes states from enacting laws that impair the obligations 
of contracts.  The Railway Labor Court, under this view, sought to impose a similar re-
straint on Congress, preventing it from interfering with existing contractual relationships 
with the railroad’s preferred creditors.  According to this reading, in holding that RITA 
could not be enacted under the commerce power, the uniformity requirement of the 
Bankruptcy Clause served as a “federal analog of the Contracts Clause” that “mirror[ed] 
an explicit (and therefore generally applicable) limitation” on states.  Id. at 315–16.  
Congress’s inability to enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws under the Commerce Clause, 
therefore, is not the result of the external application of Bankruptcy Clause limitations, 
but an outgrowth of the express limitations of the Contract Clause. 
   This reading of Railway Labor dramatically overstates the Court’s reliance on the Con-
tract Clause.  The Contract Clause rationale was not addressed in the parties’ briefs and 
was entertained in only a single question at oral argument.  See Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. 457 (Nos. 80-415 & 80-1239), reprinted in 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1981 TERM SUPPLEMENT, at 393 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 
1983).  The Railway Labor opinion refers to the Contract Clause by name only twice.  Ry. 
Labor 455 U.S. at 472 n.14.  In discussing the difficulty of defining the subject matter of 
bankruptcy regulation, the Court noted that the Bankruptcy Clause “includes the power 
to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities,” something that “the States 
were forbidden to do.”  Id. at 466 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 
188 (1902)).  Second, the Court suggested in a footnote that the desire for uniformity 
finds expression in both the text of the Bankruptcy Clause and in the decision to reserve 
bankruptcy as an exclusively federal concern.  Id. at 472 n.14. 
   Neither of these references supports the Court’s posited attempt to apply the uni-
formity requirement as a federal instantiation of the Contract Clause.  At most, these iso-
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States,50 the Court considered a potential conflict between Congress’s 
power to “coin Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof,”51 and its 
power to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States.”52  The 
government issued bonds “payable in United States gold coin of the 
present standard of value.”53  Subsequently, Congress enacted legisla-
tion rendering these “gold clause[s]” void and permitting payment 
“in any coin or currency,” substantially devaluing the bonds.54 
According to the Court, “[t]he question [was] whether the Con-
gress can use [the power to regulate the value of money] so as to in-
validate the terms of the obligations which the Government has the-
retofore issued in the exercise of the power to borrow money on the 
credit of the United States.”55  Because Congress lacks the authority to 
alter or destroy its obligations, the legislation exceeded Congress’s 
authority to regulate the value of money.56  An inherent limit of one 
enumerated power57 restrained Congress from enacting legislation 
otherwise justified by another. 
Even where the Court has upheld legislation challenged on the 
basis of inter-clause conflict, it has recognized that one enumerated 
power may constrain another under appropriate circumstances.  The 
Head Money Cases58 serve as one example.  After Congress enacted leg-
islation imposing a fifty-cent fee on sea vessels for every non-citizen 
passenger arriving in the United States,59 ship owners brought suit.  
They argued that the Act functioned as a tax, but failed to conform to 
the uniformity requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 160 because 
the fee did not apply to land-based immigration.61 
 
lated statements demonstrate the Court’s recognition that the Contract Clause, in part, 
furthered the same policy objective that motivated the Framers to insist upon uniform 
federal bankruptcy laws.  The leap from this recognition to the claim that the uniformity 
requirement is uniquely suited for external application because it serves as a proxy for the 
Contract Clause is a long one. 
 49 For a detailed discussion of the cases relevant to inter-clause conflict, see Dotan Oliar, 
Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding Statutes’ Constitutionality:  The Case of 
Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2007). 
 50 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 53 Perry, 294 U.S. at 347. 
 54 Id. at 349; see also S.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong., 48 Stat. 112 (1933). 
 55 Perry, 294 U.S. at 350. 
 56 Id. at 353–54. 
 57 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 58 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 59 Id. at 580–81; see also Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. 
 60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 61 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594–95. 
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The Court had little trouble concluding that the Act was within 
the positive authority granted by the Commerce Clause, as it directly 
regulated foreign commerce.62  Nonetheless, the Court analyzed 
whether the statute conflicted with the uniformity requirement of the 
Tax Clause, concluding that because the fee applied to all foreign 
passengers arriving at all ports, it was sufficiently uniform.63  The 
Court’s consideration of the question of uniformity suggests that it 
understood that the limits of one clause could impinge Congress’s 
power under another, and that the scope of Congress’s positive 
commerce authority was insufficient to resolve the question of inter-
clause conflict. 
But at least one case, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,64 
arguably supports the contrary proposition—that Congress may enact 
legislation that violates the limits of one grant of authority by acting 
under an alternative source of power.  In Heart of Atlanta, the Court 
upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination 
by “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodg-
ing to transient guests” on the basis of “race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin.”65  The motel argued that the Act was not within Con-
gress’s commerce authority.  The Court disagreed, holding that 
activities regulated by the Act were sufficiently interstate to fall within 
the commerce power.66 
Read in isolation, Heart of Atlanta is a case concerned purely with 
the scope of Congress’s positive authority under the Commerce 
Clause.  The issue of inter-clause conflict arises only when Heart of At-
lanta is read in contrast with the Civil Rights Cases,67 decided some 
eighty years earlier.  There, the Court considered the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, which punished those who denied individuals “full and equal 
enjoyment of the accommodations . . . of inns . . . and other places of 
public amusement.”68  The Court, writing decades before the expan-
sion of the commerce power, assumed that the power to enact such 
legislation could be found, if anywhere, in the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments.”69  But according to the Court, since it penal-
 
 62 Id. at 595. 
 63  Id. at 596. 
 64 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 65 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(a), (b)(1), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243. 
 66 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. 
 67 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 68 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336.. 
 69 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10; see also U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XIV. 
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ized private conduct rather than state action, the Fourteenth 
Amendment offered insufficient support.70 
If the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidated the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, one could argue, the Court’s subsequent approval 
of the 1964 Act as an exercise of the commerce power shows that 
Congress is free to disregard limits found elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion by acting under another enumerated power.  At the very least, 
Heart of Atlanta reflects an implicit recognition that the limits of Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment do not restrain Congress when 
it seeks to remedy discrimination through the regulation of interstate 
commerce.71  But it would be easy to overstate the importance of 
Heart of Atlanta as a window into the Court’s thinking about inter-
clause conflict.  Heart of Atlanta, after all, does not explicitly consider, 
much less reject, the notion that some limits on legislative authority 
apply externally under appropriate circumstances.72 
Railway Labor, Perry, and the Head Money Cases all embrace the no-
tion that limits contained within one enumerated power can con-
strain legislation otherwise permissible under another grant of au-
thority.  The contrast between these cases and Heart of Atlanta’s silent 
reluctance to acknowledge and resolve a potential inter-clause con-
flict reveals in even sharper relief the questions left unanswered by 
Railway Labor—namely, which limits apply externally and under what 
circumstances.  But these unanswered questions cannot be addressed 
without first exploring the primary cause of inter-clause conflict:  the 
breadth of the modern commerce power. 
 
 70 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–25.  The Court likewise rejected the Thirteenth Amen-
dement as a proper source for Congress’s power to pass the Act since the refusal of such 
accomodations, in the Court’s view, had “nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servi-
tude.” Id. at 24. 
 71 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was confident that Congress made no attempt to act 
pursuant to its commerce authority.  109 U.S. at 19 (“And whether Congress, in the exer-
cise of its power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not 
pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another, is al-
so a question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in 
any such view.”).  But the Court suggested that had the Act been limited to interstate 
commerce, the Constitution would have posed no bar.  Id. at 18  (“Of course, these re-
marks [as to lack of congressional power] do not apply to those cases in which Congress is 
clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, . . .  as in the 
regulation of commerce . . . among the several States . . . . In these cases Congress has 
power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct 
and transactions of individuals in respect thereof.”). 
 72 The Court distinguished the 1875 Act on the grounds that it regulated a broader category 
of largely intrastate activity and determined that the Civil Rights Cases were “inapposite, 
and without precedential value” in its consideration of the 1964 Act.  Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). 
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C.  Commerce Clause Expansion 
Although conflicts between alternative sources of congressional 
authority occasionally arise in other contexts, inter-clause conflict is 
primarily an outgrowth of the expansive reading of the Commerce 
Clause that has prevailed for the past seventy years.  The original 
scope of the commerce power is open to debate, but a growing body 
of opinion agrees that it was far narrower than contemporary doc-
trine would suggest.73  Prior to the expansion of the commerce pow-
er, the grants of legislative authority conferred distinct powers upon 
the legislature.  As a result, Congress and the courts rarely had occa-
sion to question whether a limit in one enumerated power should 
constrain action under another.  The distinct nature of Congress’s 
enumerated powers also explains the Framers’ failure to unambigu-
ously identify external limits.  But as the commerce power expanded, 
the likelihood of inter-clause conflicts increased; after the Court’s de-
cision in Wickard v. Filburn,74 they became unavoidable. 
The Court’s first opportunity to examine the scope of the com-
merce power came in 1824 when it decided Gibbons v. Ogden, a dis-
pute between two rival ferry operators.75  Chief Justice Marshall’s opi-
nion held that the commerce power was not limited “to traffic, to 
buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities,” but em-
braced navigation as well.76  The Court recognized that “[c]ommerce 
among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each 
State, but may be introduced into the interior.”77  But Chief Justice 
Marshall excluded the power to regulate commerce that is “com-
pletely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, 
 
 73 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Clause’s text, 
structure, and history all indicate that, at the time of the founding, the term ‘commerce’ 
consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 857–62 (2003) (concluding that the public shared a 
similar understanding of the meaning of “commerce”); Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112–25 (2001) (concluding, on the 
basis of contemporary sources, that “commerce” referred to trade, rather than economic 
activity broadly). 
 74  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 75 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 76 Id. at 189.  This view, as the Court noted, was consistent with the well-accepted under-
standing of “commerce” at the time of ratification.  See id. at 190 (“All America under-
stands, and has uniformly understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.  
It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was 
framed.”). 
 77 Id. at 194. 
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or between different parts of the same State, and which does not ex-
tend to or affect other States” from Congress’s commerce authority.78 
In the century following Gibbons, the Court’s interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause evolved in parallel along three distinct fronts.  The 
Court explored the extent to which intrastate journeys that are com-
ponents of interstate travel are the proper subject of congressional 
regulation.79  It grappled with the relationship between commerce, 
narrowly defined, and other productive activities like manufacturing 
and agriculture.80  And it considered legislation that used the com-
merce power to regulate local activities deemed immoral or danger-
ous.81  Although this period yielded incremental extensions of the 
commerce power, the Court retained meaningful and identifiable 
limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority consistent with its 
approach in Gibbons.  But with the Court’s decision in Wickard v. Fil-
burn,82 those longstanding limits were fundamentally altered. 
In Wickard, the Court upheld an amendment to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938,83 which imposed limitations on the produc-
tion of wheat and other commodities, as a valid exercise of the com-
 
 78 Id.  Reading Gibbons as sanctioning anything approaching a substantial effects test ignores 
Chief Justice Marshall’s treatment of inspection laws: 
 That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on com-
merce, will not be denied; but that a power to regulate commerce is the source 
from which the right to pass them is derived, cannot be admitted.  The object of 
inspection laws, is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a 
country . . . . They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign 
commerce, or of commerce among the States . . . .  
 No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress . . . . 
  Id. at 203.  But see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1402–05 (1987) (criticizing this reading). 
 79 See The Shreveport Rate Cases 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (“Congress . . . may prevent the 
common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being 
used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce.”); The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (holding that vessels in intrastate travel are subject to 
interstate commerce regulations if carrying goods bound for or originating in out-of-state 
markets). 
 80 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (holding that “[t]he relation of 
employer and employee” does not constitute interstate commerce); United States v. E.C. 
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the manufacture of sugar and the regulation 
of related monopolies were beyond the commerce power); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 
(1888) (holding that a statute banning the manufacture of liquor was not a regulation of 
commerce). 
 81 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that a prohibition against inter-
state shipment of goods manufactured with child labor exceeded Congress’s authority 
because the goods themselves were not dangerous); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding a statute prohibiting the transport of lottery tickets 
across state lines). 
 82  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 83  Act of May 26, 1941, Pub. L. No.  74, 55 Stat. 203. 
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merce power.84  Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer, argued that his 
growing and harvesting of wheat in excess of the defined quota was 
not the proper subject of federal regulation since the wheat grown on 
his farm was exclusively put to his own private use and never entered 
the stream of commerce, interstate or otherwise.85 
But the Court held that regulation of Filburn’s noncommercial 
production and consumption of wheat was within the scope of Com-
merce Clause authority because Filburn’s use substantially affected 
interstate commerce.86  Had he not grown the wheat, Filburn likely 
would have purchased substitute wheat on the market.  By opting out 
of the market, Filburn and others like him decreased interstate de-
mand and interfered with federal efforts to regulate nationwide pric-
es and supply.87 
After Wickard, discerning any limits on the commerce power be-
came a difficult task.  For decades, the Court consistently upheld 
every statute challenged as an invalid exercise of the Commerce 
Clause.88  Not until its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez89 did the 
Court enforce any limits on the commerce power.  In Lopez, the 
Court held that the logical connection between carrying guns in 
school zones and harm to interstate commerce was too attenuated to 
support the Gun Free School Zones Act.90  The Court applied similar 
logic five years later, striking down the Violence Against Women Act 
in United States v. Morrison.91 
 
 84 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118–29 (discussing whether the Commerce Clause provides con-
gressional authority to regulate the intrastate production and consumption of wheat and 
concluding it does).   
 85 Id. at 118. 
 86 Id. at 128–29 (“This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have con-
sidered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of 
regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to 
stimulate trade therein at increased prices.”).  The substantial effects doctrine has its be-
ginnings in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,  301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that ac-
tivities that “have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions” are within the commerce power). 
 87 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127. 
 88 After Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court invalidated only two such 
acts, neither of which were held to exceed the internal limits of the Commerce Clause.  
See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
(relying on the Tenth Amendment). 
 89 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 90 Id. at 583. 
 91 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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Despite this brief flirtation with cabining the commerce power, 
the Court’s most recent major Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. 
Raich,92 reaffirmed Wickard as controlling precedent in cases address-
ing economic activity, broadly construed.  Raich held that personal 
production, possession, and consumption of marijuana for medical 
purposes, much like Filburn’s wheat, contributed to “both the supply 
and demand sides” of an interstate market and could thus be prohib-
ited under the Controlled Substances Act.93  At least for “economic” 
activities,94 the commerce power continues to enjoy the broad scope 
set out in Wickard. 
This broad reading of the Commerce Clause greatly increases the 
risk of inter-clause conflict.95  By encroaching upon formerly distinct 
spheres of legislative authority, the modern commerce power risks 
subsuming the remaining enumerated powers, and with them, their 
limits.  If, for example, the Commerce Clause gives Congress inde-
pendent authority to regulate copyright and related rights—a field 
that substantially affects interstate commerce—the internal limits of 
Clause 8 could be rendered dead letters.  The scope of Congress’s 
commerce authority, therefore, forces a choice between the external 
application of the limits of other legislative grants or the effective 
elimination of constitutional text. 
 
 92 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 93 Id. at 30. 
 94 The Court was satisfied that the activity in Raich was economic despite the fact that the 
marijuana in question had “never been bought or sold.”  Id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
 95 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), offer one clear example of the creeping impe-
rialism of the Commerce Clause and the resulting likelihood of conflicts with the limits of 
Clause 8.  There, the Court struck down Congress’s first attempt to create a federal 
trademark statute.  See Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (“An act to punish the 
counterfeiting of trade-mark goods and the sale or dealing in of counterfeit trade-mark 
goods.”).  First, the Court concluded that trademark legislation—because it required no 
originality or invention—could not be justified by Clause 8.  The Court then determined 
that the statute was also beyond Congress’s then-narrow commerce authority since the 
legislation regulated non-interstate commerce.  Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98.  Because 
the statute violated the limits of both sources of authority, the Court had no reason to 
consider any potential conflicts between them.  But reading the Trade-Mark Cases with an 
appreciation of the broad scope of the modern commerce power, the looming inter-
clause conflict between Clause 8 and the Commerce Clause is hard to miss.  The relation-
ship between contemporary trademark law and the limits of Clause 8 is addressed infra at 
note 255. 
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II.  THE RULE AGAINST SUPERFLUITY AND INTER-CLAUSE CONFLICT 
Without a coherent general approach, courts are left to resolve 
each inter-clause conflict on an ad hoc basis, yielding inconsistent re-
sults that lack predictive value.96  This Part outlines a method for re-
solving inter-clause conflicts that preserves the limits on Congress’s 
enumerated powers without forcing a wholesale rejection of the con-
temporary reading of the Commerce Clause.  Under this approach, 
the commerce power is free to regulate activities that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce so long as it does not strip the limits found 
in other enumerated powers of their meaning.  If legislation justified 
under the commerce power would effectively eliminate text found 
 
 96 Other commentators have offered approaches that focus on the unique qualities of 
Clause 8.  Professors Heald and Sherry, for example, have proposed an approach for re-
solving such conflicts on the basis of historical evidence.  Heald & Sherry, supra note 6, at 
1128–37.  They argue that the historical record suggests that Clause 8 was drafted and ra-
tified against a backdrop that regarded federal power to grant monopolies with suspicion 
and permitted such restraints only in limited and well-defined circumstances.  Id. at 
1144–47.  Attempts to use the commerce power to circumvent those limits, therefore, 
contradict the intent of the Framers. 
   Although this historical approach provides a compelling narrative, it is inconclusive.  
Clause 8 was the subject of precious little recorded debate, during both the Convention 
and ratification.  Nachbar, supra note 48, at 292; Oliar, supra note 1, at 1790–91.  Further, 
the practices of the states, only two of which prohibited state-sanctioned monopolies, cast 
some doubt on the the notion that monopolies were an overriding concern.  Nachbar, 
supra note 48, at 343.  And although four states sought the inclusion of a prohibition 
against the granting of exclusive rights in commerce in the Constitution, that suggestion 
ultimately failed.  Id. at 340, 343.  In the end, given the incomplete and conflicting re-
cord, history alone serves as an insufficient guide in determining the external applicabil-
ity of the limits of Clause 8. 
   Professor Patry, in contrast, has approached the issue of inter-clause conflict by char-
acterizing Clause 8 as creating two sorts of rights—a “positive right” that vests in authors 
and a “negative right” that permits the public to copy unoriginal material.  Patry, supra 
note 6, at 364–65.  Legislation granting exclusive rights in unoriginal works—if enacted 
pursuant to other enumerated powers—would not interfere with this positive right.  But 
such a grant  would impermissibly impinge upon the public’s negative right. 
   Patry’s description of this inter-clause conflict is a powerful one.  But to the extent his 
argument justifies external application of Clause 8 limits on the basis of conflict with the 
public’s negative right to copy, it begs the question.  The issue is whether the limits in 
Clause 8—the originality requirement among them—can constrain congressional action 
under another grant of power.  Reclassification of those limits as “negative rights” as-
sumes the very proposition to be proven.  A constitutional right, after all, is shorthand for 
an interest that is protected from interference by otherwise permissible governmental or 
private action.  To claim that the limits in Clause 8 apply externally because they give rise 
to negative rights merely restates the question in the form of an affirmative answer.  Pa-
try’s characterization of the public’s ability to copy unoriginal material is, in large meas-
ure, accurate.  But, in the effort to distinguish between internal and external limits, the 
existence of this right is a conclusion, not a premise. 
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elsewhere in the Constitution, the Commerce Clause must yield to 
those external limits. 
But a rule against superfluous text cannot resolve inter-clause con-
flicts on its own.  Courts still need a way to distinguish descriptions of 
a particular enumerated power from limits that restrain other grants 
of authority.  As this Part explains, those distinctions can be drawn by 
examining potential limits in the broader context of Congress’s legis-
lative power as a whole.  Through this comparative analysis, courts 
will find that not all language that looks like a limit functions like 
one. 
A.  Superfluity as a Trigger for External Limits 
Interpretations of a document—whether a contract,97 patent,98 or 
statute99—that strip text of all meaning are strongly disfavored.  
Courts assume that the authors of a document include each word or 
phrase in order to effectuate their intent.  Readings that render text 
meaningless should be rejected in favor of constructions that give ef-
fect to all of the text in a document.100 
 
 97 See, e.g., Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supplemental Mgmt. Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091, 
1095 (2d Cir. 1993) (“By examining the entire contract, we safeguard against adopting an 
interpretation that would render any individual provision superfluous.”); Blake Constr. 
Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743, 746–47 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An interpretation which 
gives reasonable meaning to all parts of a contract is preferred to one which renders part 
of it insignificant or useless.”); Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 
516, 522 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting the principle under California law that “[t]he whole of a 
contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, 
each clause helping to interpret the other” (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1641 (West 
1985))(alteration in original)). 
 98 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A 
claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one 
that does not do so.”); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 
1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (construing claim to avoid rendering a claim limitation su-
perfluous). 
 99 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (describing the rule against superflu-
ity as a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 404 (2000))); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) 
(“[W]e construe statutes, where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts 
thereof.”); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to 
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting Montclair v. 
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))). 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751–52 (1st Cir. 1985) (“All words 
and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and 
no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases mean-
ingless, redundant or superfluous.”). 
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Not surprisingly, the Court has looked to potential superfluity in 
resolving questions of constitutional interpretation.  Justice Thomas, 
concurring with the judgment in Lopez, took issue with the Court’s 
failure to explicitly reject Wickard for this very reason: 
[O]n this Court’s understanding of congressional power under . . . [the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper] Clauses, many of Congress’ other 
enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, are wholly superfluous.  After all, if 
Congress may regulate all matters that substantially affect commerce, 
there is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may enact 
bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and 
measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securi-
ties, cl. 6.  Likewise, Congress would not need the separate authority to 
establish post offices and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents and copy-
rights, cl. 8, or to “punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas,” cl. 10. . . . 
Put simply, much if not all of Art. I, § 8 (including portions of the 
Commerce Clause itself), would be surplusage if Congress had been 
given authority over matters that substantially affect interstate commerce.  
An interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply 
cannot be correct.101 
Likewise, Railway Labor relied on the rule against superfluity.  The 
Court explained that RITA was impermissible under the Commerce 
Clause because “hold[ing] that Congress had the power to enact 
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause . . . would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the 
power of Congress.”102  Regardless of the scope of Commerce Clause 
authority, the Court refused to allow Congress to exercise that power 
where doing so would render constitutional text superfluous.103 
Just as RITA threatened to eradicate the uniformity requirement 
of the Bankruptcy Clause, a reading of the Commerce Clause that 
permits Congress to evade the limits of Clause 8 would render those 
limits meaningless.104  Clause 8 enables exclusive rights that serve as 
economic incentives for the invention and creation of goods distrib-
uted through interstate commerce.  Congress, therefore, could pre-
sumably enact the Patent and Copyright Acts as they exist today using 
its Commerce Clause authority, even if Clause 8 were stricken from 
 
101 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588–89 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
102 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982). 
103 Id. 
104 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products:  Muscling Copy-
right and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 230 
(“Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power, such as the Copyright Clause, 
would be meaningless if Congress could evade them simply by announcing that it was act-
ing under some broader authority.”) 
  
1102 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 10:5 
 
the Constitution altogether.105  More importantly, a Commerce Clause 
unrestrained by external limits would empower Congress to enact 
legislation that disregards the limits of Clause 8—durational or oth-
erwise.  An expanded Commerce Clause unchecked by external lim-
its, therefore, not only renders the positive authority of Clause 8 re-
dundant, it also strips the limits of Clause 8 of all meaning. 
This result stands in stark contrast with the Framers’ conception 
of the respective roles of the Commerce Clause and Clause 8.  Re-
gardless of the precise scope of the commerce power, intellectual 
property regimes of the sort found in the Patent and Copyright Acts 
were thought to require a separate and additional source of author-
ity.106  Clause 8 provided that authority, but only within the strictures 
of its limits. 
Perhaps, as some have suggested, opponents of quasi-copyright 
regimes that ignore Clause 8 limits should simply direct “their ire” 
towards Wickard.107  Certainly, one response to the nullification of 
constitutional text by the expansion of the commerce power is to re-
ject the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence altogether.  But 
short of abandoning the modern regulatory state in favor of a federal 
government loyal to the Framers’ narrow understanding of the 
Commerce Clause, this Article suggests an approach that may prove 
more palatable to those reluctant to take the plunge into the deep 
end of originalism. 
In order to preserve meaningful limits while avoiding a strict and 
potentially disruptive originalism, the rule against superfluity must be 
applied any time the Commerce Clause would provide Congress with 
authority denied by other enumerated powers.108  This approach ac-
commodates the evolution of the Commerce Clause, but it also im-
poses an important constraint on the outer limits of its expansion.  
 
105 See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 63–64 (acknowledging this possibility). 
106 See generally Oliar, supra note 1. 
107 Nachbar, supra note 48, at 350 (implying that the broad interpretation of the commerce 
power under Wickard makes Clause 8 powers superfluous). 
108 Where the Commerce Clause provides an alternative source of authority to another legis-
lative power, in a strict sense it renders that power superfluous.  But to the extent the 
commerce power is coextensive with the positive authority of another grant, the Com-
merce Clause confers Congress no additional power.  To take an example familiar from 
Railway Labor, assume the modern Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to estab-
lish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  This annexation of bankruptcy authority renders the positive au-
thority provided by Clause 4 superfluous, but it does not alter the scope of Congress’s 
overall authority.  Regardless of the clause employed, Congress has the same authority—
to uniformly regulate bankruptcy. 
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Where Congress uses the Commerce Clause to eliminate or ignore a 
limit within another enumerated power, that limit must be applied 
externally, and the commerce power must yield. 
The Commerce Clause cannot annex the authority defined by 
other enumerated powers if doing so would read the limits of those 
clauses out of the Constitution.  But it is free to fill the originalist 
void—that region of legislative space not addressed by other enumer-
ated powers.  In large part, the expansion of the Commerce Clause 
brought within the umbrella of federal regulation power that was not 
addressed by other legislative powers.  The regulation of environ-
mental standards, employment practices, wired and wireless commu-
nications, corporate governance, and food and drugs, for example, 
would remain well within congressional authority if limits on legisla-
tive authority were applied externally.  The inclusion of these fields of 
regulation within an expanded Commerce Clause, even if inconsis-
tent with the Framers’ intent, creates no risk of superfluity.  And so 
long as the scope of the commerce power is confined to areas not al-
ready governed by a separate constitutional provision, the text of 
each legislative grant will retain meaning. 
But this approach faces an important hurdle.  The rule against 
superfluity applies with equal force to all external limits.  In order for 
courts to resolve inter-clause conflict, they must be capable of distin-
guishing external limits, which constrain other enumerated powers, 
from internal limits, which merely describe the scope of a particular 
grant of authority. 
B.  Identifying Limits on Enumerated Powers 
Distinctions between internal and external limits on legislative au-
thority cannot be drawn on the basis of text alone.  Instead, these dis-
tinctions emerge when limits are analyzed in the broader context of 
Congress’s legislative authority as a whole.  Because external limits 
constrain Congress’s power to act under other legislative grants, they 
define relationships between clauses.  The effect of a would-be limit, 
therefore, cannot be judged without comparing it to the other pow-
ers it would act upon.109 
 
109 See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1995) (“Read in isolation, most 
of the Constitution’s provisions make only a highly limited kind of sense.  Only as an in-
terconnected whole do these provisions meaningfully constitute a frame of govern-
ment . . . .”). 
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This comparative analysis begins with the clause containing the 
potential external limit.  Each clause confers upon Congress some 
positive authority to legislate.  The scope of that power is defined 
primarily by its own limits.  If those limits are merely descriptive, they 
are silent about the reach of Congress’s other powers.  But external 
limits deny Congress some measure of authority.  For example, the 
Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to enact uniform bank-
ruptcy laws.  But since the uniformity requirement is an external lim-
it, it simultaneously denies Congress the power to enact non-uniform 
bankruptcy laws. 
Once the authority that a particular limit would deny Congress 
has been identified, it should be compared to the authority granted 
by the other enumerated powers.  If another power grants Congress 
the same authority that the limit would deny, that text cannot rea-
sonably be considered an external limit.  In other words, if the legis-
lative power forbidden by the limits of the first clause is granted by 
the positive authority of another clause, the first contains no enforce-
able external limits.110  But to the extent the authority forbidden by a 
limit of one power is not permitted by any other legislative grant, 
Congress should be precluded from acting in a manner that ignores 
that limit. 
The relationship between the sixth and tenth clauses of Section 8 
offers perhaps the clearest instance of text that appears, in isolation, 
to function as an external limit, but serves a purely descriptive pur-
pose.  Clause 6 authorizes Congress to “provide for the Punishment 
of counterfeiting . . . [the currency] of the United States.”111  If the 
phrase “of the United States” functioned as an external limit, Con-
gress would be precluded from punishing the counterfeiting of for-
eign currency.  But a contextual analysis reveals that another enu-
merated power provided Congress the very authority putatively 
denied by that phrase.  Clause 10, which grants Congress authority to 
“define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,”112 em-
 
110 This approach might help to clarify the apparent inter-clause conflict raised by the Civil 
Rights Cases and Heart of Atlanta.  See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.  The 
Court's holding in the Civil Rights Cases relied on the fact that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment enabled Congress to legislate with regard to state, but not private, action.  Because 
the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate private action, the legislative author-
ity that would be denied by applying the state-action limitation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment externally is squarely within Congress’s commerce power.  The state-action 
limit describes the scope of Congress’s additional power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not a restraint on the commerce power or its expansion.  
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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powers Congress to punish counterfeiters of foreign currency, as the 
Court has long recognized.113  If Congress is entitled to punish coun-
terfeiters of both foreign and domestic currency, the phrase “of the 
United States” cannot be said to function as an external limit on con-
gressional authority.114  This example, among others,115 demonstrates 
that not all would-be limits actually constrain Congress from acting 
under other grants of authority.   
Some opponents of robust external limits suggest that they could 
give rise to counterintuitive constraints on congressional power.116  If 
Clause 10 empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Fe-
lonies committed on the high Seas,” is Congress precluded from pun-
ishing felonies that occur on land?117  And if the power to establish 
 
113 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1887) (holding that the United States has 
an obligation under the law of nations to protect foreign currency from counterfeiting).  
Adding further support to the notion that these two clauses are not in tension is the fact 
that in an early draft of the Constitution, the power over “the Punishment of counterfeit-
ing . . . the Coin of the United States” and “[the punishment] of Offences against the Law 
of Nations” were contained in the same clause.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 168, 182 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
114 Conceivably, state currency could constitute non-U.S. currency.  During the colonial pe-
riod, states coined their own currency.  See, e.g., Louis Jordan, Colonial Currency, 
http://www.coins.nd.edu/ColCurrency/CurrencyText/Contents.html (last visited Mar. 
31, 2008) (providing photographs of and explanations for the developments of colonial 
currency).  But this reading is foreclosed by the Constitution itself; with ratification, the 
states ceded their authority to “coin Money; [emit] Bills of Credit; [and] make any Thing 
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
115 The Court has also resolved potential conflicts between Congress’s power to “raise and 
support Armies” and the Militia Clauses by recognizing that the Militia Clauses are sub-
sumed within Congress’s broad power under Clause 12.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 
15, 16.  In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Court upheld a challenge 
to a selective military draft.  Potential draftees argued that the statute was inconsistent 
with the limitations of the Militia Clauses, which permit Congress to call forth the militia 
“to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.  The Court found that the power to raise an Army gave Congress 
“complete authority” over the creation and funding of the military.  Draft Law Cases, 245 
U.S. at 382.  The Militia Clauses, therefore, serve only as an alternate means by which 
Congress can establish a military force, one that requires less than the full measure of its 
authority.  The Militia Clauses simply “diminished the occasion for the exertion by Con-
gress of its military power beyond the strict necessities for its exercise by giving the power 
to Congress to direct the organization and training of the militia.”  Id. at 383; see also Per-
pich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 349 (1990) (“[F]ar from being a limitation on [the 
powers to ‘provide for the common Defence,’ ‘raise and support Armies,’ [and] ‘make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces’], the Militia 
Clauses are—as the constitutional text plainly indicates—additional grants of pow-
er . . . .”). 
116 See Nachbar, supra note 48, at 295. 
117 Clause 10 grants Congress authority to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the high Seas.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  If “high Seas” functions as an exter-
nal limit, it could preclude punishing those same offenses on land.  Since many federal 
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criminal statutes are justified under the Commerce Clause, this limit would place a sig-
nificant constraint on Congress’s commerce power.  See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:  
The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 656 (1997) (explaining that Con-
gress usually relies on its commerce power to enact federal criminal law).  But the “high 
Seas” language functions primarily descriptively and, even at the time of ratification, im-
posed no limit on Congress’s power to define and punish crimes on land, whatever the 
scope of Congress’s authority to enact criminal laws. 
   Two primary definitions of the phrase “high seas” emerge from the historical record.  
The first and narrower of these definitions recognizes three distinct zones of navigable 
waters:  inland, or internal waters; the territorial sea, comprised of those waters along a 
nation’s shores; and the high seas, which are international waters outside the territorial 
sea and not within the dominion of any particular nation.  See United States v. Louisiana, 
394 U.S. 11, 22–23 (1969) (recognizing the international tradition distinguishing these 
three zones); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907) (describing the high seas as “out-
side the territory in a place belonging to no other sovereign”); The “Scotland,” 105 U.S. 
24, 29 (1881) (noting that on the high seas, “the law of no particular State has exclusive 
force, but all are equal”); United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 558, 559 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) 
( . . . .“[T]he high seas were, properly speaking, within the territory of no state or coun-
try”); United States v. Morel, 26 F. Cas. 1310, 1312 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1834) (“[T]he high 
sea . . . is that which is . . . under the particular right or jurisdiction of no sover-
eign . . . .”).  
   If the high seas were understood to exclude coastal territorial waters and inland wa-
ters, application of “high Seas” as an external limit may not implicate congressional au-
thority over crimes committed on terra firma at all.  Instead, “high Seas” would remove 
from Congress’s reach the power to define and punish crimes that occur in the sea just 
off of the coast of a state or within its bays and inlets.  This reading, however, is inconsis-
tent with legislation enacted by the First Congress, which punished crimes committed not 
only “upon the high seas” but also “in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdic-
tion of any particular state.”  Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113. 
   Justice Story provided a second, and significantly broader, definition of the high seas 
as “the waters on the sea coast below low water mark, whether within the territorial boun-
daries of a foreign nation, or of a domestic state.”  See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1159, at 56 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 
1833).  In other words, the high seas include “that part of the ocean, which washes the 
sea-coast, and is without the body of any county [sic], according to the common law.”  Id. 
at 57.  This definition, although disfavored by subsequent courts, was adopted in a num-
ber of early cases.  Compare United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 94 (1820) 
(defining the high seas as “the ocean which washes a coast”), with In re Air Crash Off 
Long Island, 209 F.3d 200, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that high seas 
means “beyond the low-water mark”). 
   If this definition of “high Seas” served as an external limit, Congress could face a bar 
to punishing crimes on land.  Since a “piracy” is, by definition, a “robbery upon the sea,” 
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820), the class of piracies that occur 
on land is a null set.  Felonies, on the other hand, included all crimes punished by the 
forfeiture of land or property at common law, particularly those for which capital pun-
ishment could be imposed.  See STORY, supra at, § 1155.  So a prohibition against legisla-
tion punishing felonies on land would indeed be a genuine and significant limit on Con-
gress’s power. 
   But a review of the remainder of the Constitution and the legislation enacted by the 
First Congress reveals that no limit interfered with the punishment of felonies on land.  
Article III, Section 3 provides Congress with the power to punish treason, a power the 
First Congress exercised by imposing capital punishment for traitors.  Act of Apr. 30, 
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“post Roads” contains an external limit, is Congress barred from cre-
ating other sorts of roads?118  But once these potential limits are com-
 
1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112.  Likewise, the First Congress exercised the power granted 
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 6 by punishing counterfeiting with death.  Id. § 14.  The 
First Congress also defined and punished murder, dismemberment, and theft both on 
the high seas and on federal land.  Id. §§ 3, 13, 16.  These forays into criminal law—along 
with punishing theft of the mail and perjury—traditionally have been understood as ex-
ercises of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819). 
   So even if limits on enumerated powers apply externally, Congress remains free to 
enact criminal laws targeting activities that occur on land.  The precise scope of Con-
gress’s power to criminalize behavior by use of the commerce power is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  But if that power is to be limited, it is certainly not on the basis of the high 
seas requirement of Clause 10. 
118 Clause 7 grants Congress the power to “establish Post Offices and post Roads.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.  If “post Roads” serves as a limit on congressional authority and is 
applied externally to constrain commerce legislation, Congress could be barred from es-
tablishing roads other than post roads.  But that fear is unjustified. 
   Clause 7 can be read in two ways.  Some contend that the establishment of a post 
road permitted nothing more than the designation of preexisting roads for carrying the 
post.  See STORY, supra note 117, § 1123.  This reading conforms to early congressional 
practice.  See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232 (establishing a post office and post 
roads within the United States); Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 55, 2 Stat. 408 (establishing ad-
ditional post roads within the United States).  This reading also found support in some 
early opinions.  See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 181 (1845) (Daniel, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the postal power “confers no right to open new roads, but implies 
nothing beyond . . . the selection amongst various routes . . . most judicious to have the 
mails transported”); United States v. R.R. Bridge Co., 27 F. Cas. 686, 689 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 
1855) (stating that the postal power is “exhausted in the designation of roads on which 
the mails are to be transported”).  Under this reading, Clause 7 is entirely silent on the 
construction of roads and can impose no bar on Commerce Clause authority. 
   But this narrow use of “establish” is at odds with the meaning of the term elsewhere 
in the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (authorizing Congress to “ordain and es-
tablish” inferior courts); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to “es-
tablish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”).  The Court embraced a more robust reading 
of the power to “establish” post offices and post roads that included creation as well as de-
signation.  See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875). 
   If Clause 7 provides authority to create post roads, does a prohibition against the cre-
ation of non-post roads impose a meaningful limit on Congress?  History makes certain 
that in order for a road to be considered a post road its sole or even primary use need not 
be the transportation of the post.  The Cumberland Road is emblematic of the broad 
sweep of the postal power.  See Act of Mar. 29, 1806, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 357 (providing for the 
construction of the Cumberland road from Maryland to Ohio); Act of Apr. 28, 1810, ch. 
30, 2 Stat. 579, 584 (providing for the extension of the Cumberland Road).  The federal 
government not only funded its creation, but directly oversaw its construction.  The 
road’s simultaneous and primary use as a channel for travelers and commodities did not 
prevent Congress from exercising its postal power. 
   What then is a non-post road?  Given the scope of the postal power and the pervasive 
reach of the post, the class of non-post roads is exceedingly small.  But to the extent the 
theoretical need for non-post roads remains a concern, long before Wickard, courts rec-
ognized Congress’s power to create roads pursuant to the commerce power.  See Califor-
nia v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 39 (1888) (“The power to construct, or to authorize 
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pared to Congress’s other legislative authority, it becomes clear that 
these rhetorical counterexamples offer little substantive criticism. 
This comparative analysis, it should be noted, incorporates a cer-
tain degree of originalist bias.  If this analysis occurred against the 
backdrop of the modern Commerce Clause, it would likely demon-
strate that no limits on Congress’s power apply externally.  After all, 
whatever authority those limits would deny Congress would be within 
the scope of another enumerated power, namely the Commerce 
Clause.  In order for this analysis to resolve inter-clause conflicts, the 
comparison should proceed from a reference point that does not 
take the modern commerce power as given.  Otherwise, it would ig-
nore the very expansion of legislative power that gives rise to inter-
clause conflict in the first place.  The resolution of these conflicts, af-
ter all, is largely meant to gauge the legitimacy of Commerce Clause 
expansion into zones otherwise governed by other grants of author-
ity.  To embed that expansion into the comparative backdrop only 
begs the question.   
Even if courts are able to distinguish external limits from their in-
ternal counterparts, they still must determine whether a particular 
external limit is implicated by a challenged statute.  That task is dis-
cussed below. 
C.  Mapping Challenged Statutes on the Constitutional Topography 
Statutes must conform to the external limits implicated by their 
subject matters; they are not subject to external limits that address 
unrelated areas of regulation.  Legislation that alters the relationship 
between debtors and their creditors must conform to the uniformity 
requirement, but a civil rights bill cannot be challenged for its lack of 
uniformity.  Nor could an act imposing environmental standards be 
held to exceed Congress’s power because it failed to satisfy the lim-
 
individuals or corporations to construct, national highways and bridges from State to 
State, is essential to the complete control and regulation of interstate commerce.”); see al-
so Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 194 (1910) (holding that the 
erection of a bridge is within “the paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce 
among the States”). 
   But the postal power did provide Congress with some authority that the pre-Wickard 
Commerce Clause could not.  Many early post roads were entirely intrastate, and there-
fore beyond the scope of the commerce power.  So to the extent “post Roads” serves as a 
limit to legislation enacted under the modern Commerce Clause, at most it precludes 
Congress from creating intrastate roads on which the post will never be carried.  As a 
practical matter, external application of that limit would not impede Congress in any 
meaningful way. 
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ited times requirement of Clause 8.  These examples, while perhaps 
frivolous, demonstrate that if a statute falls so far afield from the sub-
ject matter of a particular grant, the statute need not conform to the 
external limits of that clause.  But not all examples are quite so obvi-
ous.  Distinguishing commercial regulations from taxes, bankruptcy 
laws, or copyright laws, for example, is not as easy a task. 
The Court’s prior forays into inter-clause conflict offer some guid-
ance.  In both Railway Labor and the Head Money Cases, the Court was 
asked to determine whether the limits of one grant of authority were 
applicable to legislation arguably justified under the Commerce 
Clause.  Although the Court reached different conclusions in these 
two cases, it approached the question in similar ways.  In both cases, 
the Court saw its primary task as determining which of the two grants 
served as the true source of Congress’s authority to enact the chal-
lenged legislation. 
In order to decide if the uniformity requirement of the Bank-
ruptcy Clause rendered RITA unconstitutional, the Railway Labor 
Court thought it “necessary first to determine whether 
the . . . [statute was] an exercise of Congress’ power under the Bank-
ruptcy Clause . . . or under the Commerce Clause.”119  Acknowledging 
that this determination was “not an easy task,”120 the Court began by 
considering the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause, which con-
tained the limit in question.  Bankruptcy, according to the Court, is 
the “subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or 
fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their re-
lief.”121 
Having defined the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause, the 
Court asked whether RITA fell within it.  The Court looked to two 
factors in making this determination.  First, it considered the purpose 
and effect of the statute as revealed through its text.  Because the sta-
tute “prescribe[d] the manner in which the property of the Rock Is-
land estate [was] to be distributed among its creditors,” it functioned 
as a bankruptcy law.122  Second, the Court considered the statute’s leg-
islative history and the events surrounding its enactment.  Since Con-
gress announced its intention that “employee protection be imposed 
 
119 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465 (1982).  For further details on 
this case, see supra notes 35–49 and accompanying text.  
120 Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465. 
121 Id. at 466 (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938)). 
122 Id. at 467. 
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in bankruptcy proceedings involving major rail carriers”123 only after 
Rock Island initiated reorganization proceedings, the Court was con-
fident that RITA reflected an exercise of the bankruptcy power. 
The Head Money Cases124 took a similar approach.  There, the Court 
had to determine whether the uniformity requirement of Clause 1 
applied to the fifty-cent fee charged to ship operators.  Because the 
statute at issue appeared to regulate foreign commerce, but also lev-
ied a duty,125 the rubrics of both taxation and commercial regulation 
offered potential justifications. 
The Court began, much as it did in Railway Labor, by considering 
whether the legislation at issue was an exercise of the commerce 
power or the taxation power.  The Head Money Court determined that 
“the power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power,” but in-
stead the Commerce Clause.126  Because “the real purpose and effect 
of the statute . . . . from beginning to end . . . [was] to mitigate the 
evils inherent in the business of bringing foreigners to this coun-
try,”127 the 1882 Act, like similar regulations of commerce, “was not 
subject . . . to the rules which would invalidate an ordinary tax pure 
and simple.”128  Nonetheless, perhaps in recognition of the difficulty 
inherent in delineating the precise scope of these sources of author-
ity, the Court upheld the statute only after satisfying itself that the re-
quirements of the taxing power, which it claimed were inapplicable, 
were indeed satisfied.129 
These two cases, although separated by nearly one hundred years, 
share some common traits.  First, both Courts implicitly embraced 
the notion that the limits of one clause can constrain legislation oth-
erwise permissible under another.  Second, both cases treated the 
question of the source of Congress’s authority as an initial, and large-
ly determinative, inquiry.  If Congress acted pursuant to the power 
containing the relevant limit, the statute was unconstitutional.  But if 
the legislation was better classified as a commercial regulation, it was 
permissible. 
In adopting this approach, both cases relied on a potentially prob-
lematic common assumption—that only one legislative power can 
 
123 Id. at 468. 
124 112 U.S. 580 (1884).  For further details on this case, see supra notes 58–63 and accom-
panying text. 
125 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S at 589. 
126 Id. at 595. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 596. 
129 Id. 
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serve as the true source of congressional authority to enact any par-
ticular statute.  The Head Money Court, operating before the Com-
merce Clause had reached its full ebb, reasonably understood that 
Congress’s enumerated powers were distinct and non-overlapping.  
But the expansion of the commerce power complicates efforts by 
courts to identify the one true source of Congress’s power.  Legisla-
tion that once could have been enacted pursuant to only one con-
gressional power can now, in many instances, reasonably lay claim to 
an alternate source of authority. 
Against the backdrop of the sweeping reach of the Commerce 
Clause and the external limits that cabin its expansion, what does it 
mean to ask which power Congress has exercised in enacting legisla-
tion?  In short, courts must situate challenged statutes within the 
complex topography of overlapping legislative powers and their ex-
ternal limits. 
Mapping this topography of legislative powers requires courts to 
recognize that the logical space occupied by a particular grant is not 
defined solely by its positive authority.  Instead, it is comprised of a 
central nucleus of positive authority, surrounded by a space defined 
by the clause’s external limits.  A given statute then can fall into one 
of three regions on the topography of legislative powers with respect 
to any particular clause.  First, a statute that satisfies the limits of a 
particular clause and addresses its core subject matter falls within the 
positive authority of that clause.  In these scenarios, Congress is enti-
tled to act.  Second, a statute that addresses the core subject matter of 
an enumerated power, but violates one or more of its external limits, 
falls within the penumbra surrounding the positive authority of that 
clause.  In that case, Congress has no authority to enact the statute, 
regardless of the power it seeks to use.  Otherwise, legislation could 
escape the external limits of a clause simply by virtue of violating 
them.  Third, when the purpose and function of a statute do not ad-
dress the core subject matter of a particular enumerated power, that 
statute is beyond the reach of the external limits of that power. 
Taken together, the contours of each grant of positive authority 
and their corresponding penumbras define the topography of Con-
gress’s legislative authority.  When a court asks which of two enumer-
ated powers serves as the source of authority for a given act, at bot-
tom, the court is asking where that act falls within this topography.  
In other words, does the purpose and function of the statute in ques-
tion fall far enough away from the core concern of the grant so as to 
be free of its limits?  The next Part sketches both the limits and core 
subject matter of Clause 8. 
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III.  DEFINING THE CLAUSE 8 PENUMBRA 
Clause 8 confers upon Congress the power to “promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”130  Unlike other enumerated powers, neither the 
positive authority nor the precise limits of Clause 8 are immediately 
apparent from its text.  This Part identifies the limiting text of Clause 
8, sketches the basic restraints it places on Congress’s copyright au-
thority, and considers whether those limits apply externally to con-
strain the Commerce Clause.  This Part concludes that the limits of 
Clause 8 delineate a zone of potential legislation that runs afoul of 
the Constitution regardless of the power under which Congress in-
tends to act.  This zone defines the penumbral public domain. 
A.  The Limits of the Copyright Power 
The text of Clause 8 is unique among Congress’s enumerated 
powers in several respects.  First, Clause 8 incorporates two separate 
grants of authority.  Congress’s power to “promote the Progress of 
Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Writings”131 traditionally has been embodied in the 
Copyright Act, while the power to “promote the Progress of . . . [the] 
useful Arts . . . by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”132 has been exercised through 
the Patent Act.133  While other enumerated powers include multiple 
 
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884) (“Under the acts of 
Congress designed to give effect to [Clause 8], the persons who are to be benefited are 
divided into two classes, authors and inventors.  The monopoly which is granted to the 
former is called a copyright, that given to the latter, letters patent, or, in the familiar lan-
guage of the present day, patent right.”); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684 
(1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“This article is to be construed distributively, and 
must have been so understood; for when congress came to execute this power by legisla-
tion, the subjects are kept distinct, and very different provisions are made respecting 
them.”); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(“[T]he Constitution differentiates (a) ‘authors’ and their ‘writings’ from (b) ‘inventors’ 
and their ‘discoveries.’”); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th 
Cir. 1943) (identifying “two separate and distinct fields of protection, the copyright and 
the patent”); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 365, 367, 367 n.6 (2000) (“Article I . . . contains the patent clause, and reads as fol-
lows:  ‘The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
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distinct grants of authority,134 the two grants within Clause 8 are not 
explicitly distinguished in the text.  Second, Clause 8 is unique in that 
it includes both a “means” clause and an “ends” clause.135  The first 
half of Clause 8—the to “promote the Progress” language—serves as 
the purpose of the grant, while the latter half—the “by secur-
ing . . . exclusive Right[s]”136 language—functions to set out the 
means by which that end is achieved.  Finally, Clause 8, unlike most 
other grants, includes multiple potential limits on Congress’s author-
ity.  Whereas Congress’s bankruptcy and naturalization powers, for 
example, must simply satisfy the requirement of uniformity, Clause 8 
includes a series of limitations on the scope of congressional author-
ity.  Each of these potential external limits are discussed below. 
1.  “Promote the Progress” 
The first potential external limit of Clause 8, to “promote the Pro-
gress of Science,” has been read by courts and scholars in a variety of 
ways—as a limit, a grant, neither, and both.137 
First, this text has been understood as a limit that precludes Con-
gress from exercising its power to grant exclusive rights whenever 
such rights would fail to promote the progress of science and the use-
ful arts.  This reading finds its strongest support in Graham v. John 
Deere Co., where the Court explained that Clause 8 serves as “both a 
grant of power and a limitation” and that “Congress in the exercise of 
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the 
stated constitutional purpose.”138 
 
respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .’ The parallel construction makes it easy to iden-
tify the copyright clause:  ‘The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive right to 
their . . . Writings.’”); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes 
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1937 n.103 (2007) (noting that the use 
of the term “respective” in connection to the “Writings and Discoveries” of “Authors and 
Inventors” lends support to this reading).  But see Oliar, supra note 1, at 1789–90 n.98, 
1823 n.228 (noting that historical evidence casts some doubt on a clear dichotomy be-
tween the patent and copyright powers of Clause 8). 
134 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4, 5, 10. 
135 See Dan T. Coenen & Paul J. Heald, Means/Ends Analysis in Copyright Law:  Eldred v. Ash-
croft in One Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99, 106 (2002) (“[W]hen Congress grants copyright 
protection it can’t rely on any source of authority other than the Intellectual Property 
Clause.  Usually Article I grants of power are not deemed exclusive in this way.”). 
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
137 Oliar, supra note 1, at 1781–84 (discussing the opposing interpretations). 
138 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966); see also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 
F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing the limited judicial role in judging whether 
Congress has exceeded its Article I powers); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
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Others read this text, not as a limit on Congress’s authority, but as 
the very core of the power granted by Clause 8.139  The Bankruptcy 
Clause confers upon Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.”140  And the Commerce Clause 
grants the power to “regulate Commerce.”141  Likewise, one could ar-
gue, Clause 8 confers upon Congress the power to “promote the Pro-
gress of Science and the useful Arts.”  The remainder of the clause, 
under this view, simply spells out the permissible mechanisms for do-
ing so.  Although this reading of the clause is in keeping with the 
grammatical structure of the rest of Section 8, it has not served as the 
dominant interpretation. 
The prevailing view rejects both of these readings and instead 
treats the first half of Clause 8 as a mere preamble that serves as nei-
ther a grant of authority nor a limit on congressional power.  The as-
cendancy of this view appears to owe its origins, at least in part, to a 
rather weakly supported passage from Nimmer on Copyright.142  Despite 
the questionable provenance of this reading, courts considering the 
question have generally followed Nimmer and given the “promote 
the Progress” language no binding effect, arguably stripping this text 
of any meaning.143 
More recently, Professor Oliar—on the basis of Madison and 
Pinckney’s original proposals at the Constitutional Convention—has 
persuasively argued for a reading of “promote the Progress” that rec-
ognizes it as both a grant of authority and a limit.144  According to this 
view, the positive authority of Clause 8 is defined by the overlap of its 
means and ends clauses.  Clause 8 grants Congress authority “[t]o 
promote the Progress” precisely where it does so by exercising its au-
 
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The Congress acts un-
der the restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. I, § 8.”). 
139 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §3:5 (2008) (discussing the proposition that 
the word “promote” serves as a grant of congressional power and is synonymous with “en-
courage” and “advance”). 
140  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
141  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
142 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2008). (“This 
introductory phrase is in the main explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in it-
self constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act must be meas-
ured . . . . rather than constituting a limitation on Congressional authority, has for the 
most part tended to expand such authority.” (citation omitted)). 
143 Edward C. Walterscheid, “Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant”:  Constitutional Limi-
tations on the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 326 (2002) (arguing that treating the 
first half of Clause 8 as a preamble renders it superfluous). 
144 See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1816–18 (arguing that Clause 8 limits Congress’s power but also 
excludes Congress from using other means to exercise that power). 
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thority “[to secure] exclusive Right[s]” to “Authors and Inventors” in 
accordance with the other limits inherent in Clause 8. 
Assuming that this text functions not as a preamble but, at least in 
part, as a limit on Clause 8 authority, what does it mean “to promote 
the Progress of Science”?  The term “Science,” as used in the Consti-
tution, is not limited to the modern understanding of the term:  the 
system or process of acquiring knowledge about natural phenom-
ena.145  Rather—true to its Latin root scientia—“Science” refers more 
broadly to “[k]nowledge acquired by study; acquaintance with or 
mastery of any department of learning.”146  This limit, then, requires 
Congress to encourage or further147 the advancement148 of knowledge 
or learning when exercising its Clause 8 power.  But as discussed in-
fra, the practical implications of such a limit are ambiguous at best.149 
2.  “Limited Times” 
The second potential external limit arises from the requirement 
that Congress grant exclusive rights pursuant to Clause 8 only for 
“limited Times.”  Perhaps more so than any other Clause 8 text, the 
“limited Times” requirement intuitively appears to function as a limit 
on congressional authority. 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,150 the Court directly addressed the constraints 
this text places on Congress’s Clause 8 authority.  There, the Court 
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998,151 in part, on the grounds that the retro-
active extension of the term of protection for existing works did not 
violate the “limited Times” requirement.152  According to the Court, 
this requirement does not mean that the term of copyright protec-
 
145 See AMERICAN HERITAGE SCIENCE DICTIONARY, available at http://dictionary.reference.co
m/browse/science (last viewed August 28, 2007). 
146 Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power To Promote the Progress of Science:  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) (quoting 14 J.A. SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, THE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 648 (2d ed. 1989)). 
147 See id. at 45; see also Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“[The Act of 1790] 
was passed for the purpose of encouraging useful invention . . . .”); Mitchell v. Tilghman, 
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 418 (1873) (“Patent laws have for their leading purpose the en-
couragement of useful inventions.”). 
148 Solum, supra note 147, at 45–46 (discussing that the First Congress likely believed that 
promoting the progress meant encouraging that activity).  But see Pollack, supra note 1, at 
760 (discussing potential alternative meanings for progess). 
149 See infra Part IV.A. 
150  537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
151 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
152 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (holding that the “limited Times” prescription was not violated). 
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tion, once granted, is “forever fixed or inalterable.”153  Instead, the 
term of a grant of exclusive rights is limited if it is “confine[d] within 
certain bounds.”154  At the very least, both the Eldred majority and its 
dissenters would agree that an expressly perpetual copyright would 
violate the “limited Times” requirement.155  Although this minimal 
constraint on congressional authority does not offer a particularly ro-
bust reading of “limited Times,” it does provide a bright-line rule that 
could call into question existing federal legislation.156 
3.  “Authors” 
The word “Authors” gives rise to two distinct limits on Congress’s 
Clause 8 authority.  First, it identifies the class of those to whom ex-
clusive rights can be granted.  Second, it limits the grant of exclusive 
rights to works that exhibit some minimal level of originality. 
The exclusive rights permitted by Clause 8 may not vest in whom-
ever Congress chooses.  If Congress extends exclusive rights under its 
copyright power, those rights must vest in the author of the protected 
work.  An “author” in the constitutionally relevant sense is “he to 
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes 
a work of science or literature.”157  Congress could not, for example, 
employ its Clause 8 power to enact a copyright lottery that selects 
random citizens as the lucky recipients of copyrights in newly created 
works.  Such legislation would exceed Congress’s power since the ex-
clusive rights granted are not given to those responsible for creating 
the protected works. 
From this definition of “author” as the originator of a work, courts 
have understood Clause 8 to impose a distinct and fundamental limit 
on the scope of copyright protection.158  As the Court made clear in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. when it refused to 
extend copyright protection to unoriginal compilations of data, the 
 
153 Id. at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154 Id. (alteration in original). 
155 Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 209–10 (discussing the Court’s renewal of 
copyright extentions nothwithstanding the “limited Times” requirement). 
156 See infra Part IV.C. 
157 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); see also Nottage v. Jack-
son, 11 Q.B.D. 627, 635 (1883) (U.K. ) (Cotton, L.J., concurring) (stating that authorship 
requires “originating, making, [or] producing”). 
158 CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he requirement of original-
ity is a constitutional one inherent in the grant to Congress of the power to promote sci-
ence and the useful arts . . . .”); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“Originality is both a statutory and constitutional requirement.”).  
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Constitution demands originality.159  As a constitutional matter,160 a 
copyrightable work must be independently created—rather than cop-
ied from another—and exhibit “at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”161 
Feist cites two decisions, the Trade-Mark Cases162 and Burrow-Giles Li-
thographic Co. v. Sarony,163 as the judicial foundation of the originality 
requirement.164  According to the Feist Court, Burrow-Giles understood 
“Authors” as the situs of that requirement, while the Trade-Mark Cases 
rooted that same limit in the word “Writings.”165  Feist was correct that 
these two cases articulated a constitutional originality requirement.  
But the Court misread the Trade-Mark Cases by suggesting it under-
stood the originality requirement as a product of the term “Writings.”  
Rather, the Trade-Mark Cases, like Burrow-Giles, located the originality 
requirement in the term “Authors.” 
Justice Samuel F. Miller authored the unanimous opinions in the 
Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles in 1879 and 1884, respectively.166  
Aside from the rather puzzling insistence that two decisions written 
by the same justice, and decided within five years of each other, 
would locate the same constitutional requirement in two different 
terms, Feist’s reading of the Trade-Mark Cases fails to recognize its 
close ties to the Court’s subsequent, and perhaps more explicit, rea-
soning in Burrow-Giles. 
As discussed supra, the Trade-Mark Cases struck down Congress’s 
first attempt to enact federal trademark protection.167  In considering 
whether trademarks could be considered “writings of authors,” Justice 
Miller found that the term “writings” had been “liberally construed” 
to include not only books, maps, and charts, but also engravings, and 
prints.168  But regardless of the broad scope of “writings,” trademark 
protection could find no support in Clause 8 since its power ex-
tended only to “writings of authors”—those “such as are original, and 
are founded in the creative powers of the mind.”169 
 
159 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”). 
160 This constitutional mandate is incorporated into the current Copyright Act, which per-
mits protection only for “original works of authorship.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
161 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
162  100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
163  111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
164 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
165 Id. at 346–47. 
166 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82; Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 53  
167 See supra note 95. 
168 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
169 Id. 
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Justice Miller drew a distinction between the class of all writings 
and the subset of writings of authors.  The first refers to those works 
sufficiently tangible to be eligible for copyright protection.  The sec-
ond refers to those writings that, in addition to being reduced to 
physical form, exhibit originality.  Not all writings are constitutionally 
eligible for copyright protection.  Instead, “[t]he writings which are 
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor.”170  As the Court’s dis-
tinction suggests, a work may be written but not original.  Protectable 
works are not simply writings, but the writings of authors.  The term 
“Authors,” according to the Court, demands originality. 
In Burrow-Giles, Justice Miller relied on similar reasoning.  There, 
the Court considered a claim of copyright infringement brought by 
the photographer of a portrait of Oscar Wilde.171  The alleged in-
fringer argued that no copyright could subsist in the photograph 
since it was “not a writing of which the producer is the author.”172  
The Court rejected this contention, first recognizing that the photo-
graphs fell within the broad scope of the term “Writings.”173  Since 
photographs qualify as writings, they are protectable “so far as they 
are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the au-
thor.”174  Once again, the implicit distinction between “Writings” and 
“writings of authors” is at work.  The Court admitted the possibility 
that some photographs, despite satisfying the writings requirement, 
may lack originality.175  Only writings that clear the additional hurdle 
of originality merit protection.176 
The term “Authors” imposes two very different constraints on 
Congress’s Clause 8 authority.  It requires that Congress grant exclu-
sive rights in expression only to authors, and it insists that works sub-
ject to those exclusive rights be original. 
 
170 Id. 
171 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884). 
172 Id. at 56. 
173 Id. at 58. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 59. 
176 Id. at 59.  Given the photographer’s creative contributions, the Court was satisfied that 
the Wilde portrait was “the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which plaintiff 
is the author.”  Id. at 60.  Those contributions included “posing the said Oscar Wilde in 
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various 
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, 
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expres-
sion . . . .”  Id. 
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4.  “Writings” 
Although the term “Writings” does not serve as the source of the 
originality requirement, it does impose an additional limit on Con-
gress’s Clause 8 authority.  It guarantees that the exclusive rights 
granted to authors apply only to works embodied in some tangible 
form of expression, rather than extending to fleeting and ephemeral 
performances and utterances. 
Read literally, “Writings” likely refers only to the “literary produc-
tions of . . . authors.”177  But both Congress and the courts have tradi-
tionally adopted a flexible and expansive understanding of “Writ-
ings.”  The 1790 Act protected maps and charts, in addition to 
books.178  Subsequent legislation significantly expanded the scope of 
writings to include prints,179 musical180 and dramatic compositions,181 
photographs,182 paintings,183 drawings,184 sculptures,185 motion pic-
tures,186 and sound recordings.187 
This expansion was enabled by a definition of “Writings” that of-
fered the generality and adaptability necessary to accommodate 
technological advances.  That definition, first provided by the Court 
in Burrow-Giles, embraced “all forms of writing, printing, engraving, 
etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given 
visible expression.”188  Nearly a century later, the Court adopted a 
similar reading in Goldstein v. California, explaining that “the word 
‘writings’ . . . may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of 
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”189 
Despite the flexibility of these definitions, the Court has main-
tained at least one unyielding limit on the outer boundary of “Writ-
ings” protectable under Clause 8.  Copyright has not and cannot ex-
tend to those works that have not been reduced to some tangible 
 
177 Id. at 58. 
178 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
179 Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 26, 2 Stat. 171. 
180 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
181 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 
182 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. 
183 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230 § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488. 
187 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
188 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
189 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
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physical representation.190  Congress has never protected such works 
under copyright law191 and explicitly acknowledged this limit in 1954 
when it refused to submit to the Berne Convention.192  According to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it was “impossible to 
subscribe to the Convention” because it required “protection of ‘oral’ 
works, such as speeches [that] would have conflicted with Article I, 
Section 8 . . . .”193  Indeed, the United States agreed to join the Berne 
Convention only after a revision allowed member countries to deny 
protection to works not fixed in a tangible medium.194 
“Writings,” like each of the limits above, constrains Congress’s 
power to enact legislation pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.  
But the question of whether those limits should be interpreted to lim-
it Congress’s authority under other enumerated powers remains. 
B.  External Application of Clause 8 Limits 
In order to determine whether the limits of the copyright author-
ity of Clause 8 restrain Congress’s other legislative powers, we first 
need to identify the core subject matter of that authority.  If, prior to 
Commerce Clause expansion, another enumerated power enabled 
Congress to legislate with regard to that subject matter in a manner 
inconsistent with Clause 8 limits, those limits function merely descrip-
tively.  If, on the other hand, no other enumerated powers permitted 
Congress to reach the subject matter of Clause 8’s copyright author-
ity, those limits externally constrain Congress regardless of the power 
it attempts to use. 
While identifying the subject matter of other enumerated powers, 
like the Bankruptcy Clause, is a fairly straightforward task, Clause 8 
presents a more difficult case, in part because of its unique structure.  
 
190 In the current Copyright Act, this limit is expressed by the fixation requirement, which 
demands “embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the au-
thor, . . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the work] to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”  17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
191 Though unconstitutional for conferring on unwritten performances exclusive rights that 
are functionally equivalent to copyrights, the federal anti-bootlegging statutes, discussed 
at length in infra Part IV.C., did not attempt to protect those works through copyright 
proper. 
192  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as re-
vised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 
1161 U.N.T.S. 3  [hereinafter Berne Convention].  
193  S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 5 (1954). 
194 See Berne Convention, supra note 193, art. 2(2).  The United States entered into the 
Berne Convention on March 1, 1989.  Id.  
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The power conferred by Clause 8 could be situated in either its ends 
clause or its means clause.  The location of Clause 8 power, and, by 
extension, the definition of the core subject matter of Clause 8’s 
copyright authority could prove determinative of the question of ex-
ternal application of Clause 8 limits. 
If Clause 8 is characterized as the power to “promote the Progress 
of Science,” one could argue that the limits of Clause 8 are not prop-
erly externalized.  Even before the modern Commerce Clause 
emerged, Congress could encourage “Science” through a variety of 
means.  For example, legislation enacted in 1798 permitted the ap-
pointment of four “teachers of the arts and sciences” for military in-
struction.195  And just a few years later, Congress enacted legislation 
enabling the President to establish the United States Military Acad-
emy at West Point.196  Likewise, Congress promoted the progress of 
science with the Morrill Act of 1862,197 which provided states with fed-
eral land to establish colleges and universities.198  The Morrill Act con-
fronted constitutional challenges during congressional debate.199  
Some argued that Clause 8, by defining the exclusive means of pro-
moting the progress of science, precluded the passage of the Act.200  
But in the end, the Morrill Act was successfully justified on the basis 
of Congress’s power to dispose of federal land.201  If the core power of 
Clause 8 is the promotion of progress and alternative means of pro-
gress promotion were within Congress’s legislative authority, the lim-
its of Clause 8 cannot externally restrain Congress. 
But there is good reason to doubt a reading that situates the pow-
er of Clause 8 exclusively in the ends clause.  Such a reading fails to 
account for the functional authority Congress was granted and has 
exercised under Clause 8.  Each enumerated power enables Congress 
to take some concrete legislative action—to regulate commerce, to 
raise an army, to coin money.  However, in isolation, the power to 
 
195 Sidney Forman, Why the United States Military Academy Was Established in 1802, 29 MIL. AFFS. 
16, 22 (1965). 
196 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1312, § 27 (1802); accord Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 27, 2 Stat. 132, 
137. 
197 Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503; see also Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417. 
198 Notably, the Framers rejected a direct federal power to establish universities.  See Oliar, 
supra note 1, at 1792. 
199 See generally John H. Florer, Major Issues in the Congressional Debate of the Morrill Act of 1862, 
8 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 459 (1968). 
200 See id. at 463. 
201 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States . . . .”). 
  
1122 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 10:5 
 
“promote the Progress” supplies Congress with an amorphous goal, 
but no explicit power by which to achieve it.  In order to exercise its 
Clause 8 power, Congress must confer exclusive rights utilizing the 
means clause.  The goal of the Framers, after all, was to enable re-
gimes roughly analogous to our patent and copyright systems, subject 
to the limitations of Clause 8.202  A reading that characterizes the sub-
ject matter of Clause 8 as the promotion of progress, rather than the 
granting of exclusive rights, therefore, disregards its practical applica-
tion. 
If the power granted by Clause 8 is situated in the means clause, 
the copyright power—stripped of its limits—authorizes Congress to 
grant exclusive rights in expression.  Under this reading, if another 
enumerated power, prior to the expansion of the Commerce Clause, 
permitted Congress to grant exclusive rights in expression in a man-
ner inconsistent with a Clause 8 limit, that limit would serve a purely 
internal and descriptive function.  But to the extent granting exclu-
sive rights in expression was the sole domain of Clause 8, its limits are 
enforceable against the remainder of Congress’s enumerated powers. 
Prior to the emergence of the modern Commerce Clause, no 
enumerated power, other than Clause 8, vested Congress with author-
ity to confer exclusive rights in expression.  Indeed, no other enu-
merated powers countenanced federal grants of monopoly rights in 
any subject matter.  Needless to say, if no other legislative authority 
reached the core subject matter of Clause 8—the granting of exclu-
sive rights in expression—Congress lacked the power to create such 
rights in a manner inconsistent with the limits of Clause 8.  As such, 
the limits of Clause 8 apply even when Congress acts in the name of 
commerce. 
Some have argued that preferential taxes enacted by Congress in 
the early twentieth century functioned as exclusive rights because 
they hampered competition and increased prices.203  The Motor Car-
rier Act of 1935,204 for example, suppressed the nascent trucking in-
dustry in favor of the incumbent railroads.  Likewise, taxes on oleo-
margarine advantaged the dairy industry by increasing the costs of 
butter substitutes.205  By limiting inter-industry competition, the ar-
 
202 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966); Oliar, supra note 1, at 1816–17. 
203 Nachbar, supra note 48, at 353–54. 
204  Motor Carrier Act, 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543. 
205  See Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 784, § 2, 32 Stat. 193; see also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 
27 (1904) (discussing the tax on oleomargarine and its implications).  
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gument goes, these taxes imposed public costs similar to an exclusive 
rights regime. 
But even if some of the economic consequences were similar, 
these preferential taxes were neither rights nor exclusive.  First, these 
taxes conferred no rights.  Instead, they increased the cost of doing 
business for disfavored industries by direct taxation.  Neither the rail-
road industry nor the dairy industry received a legally enforceable 
right against their competitors or the public as a result of these taxes.  
Whatever benefit they indirectly received inured to the favored indus-
try as a whole, rather than any single person or entity.  Nor did that 
benefit permit the favored industries to exclude new competitors 
within the untaxed industry.  A tax that applies to an entire industry 
and confers no right to exclude is plainly not equivalent to an exclu-
sive right.206 
Even assuming other enumerated powers could be construed to 
enable grants of exclusive rights, none address the granting of such 
rights in expression—the core subject matter of the copyright power.  
Because no enumerated powers offered Congress authority that was 
inconsistent with the limits of Clause 8, those limits apply externally 
to constrain any congressional action that attempts to invade the sub-
ject matter of Clause 8.  Part IV addresses legislation, both enacted 
and proposed, that attempts to regulate the subject matter of Clause 
8 in a manner inconsistent with its limits. 
IV.  ENFORCING CLAUSE 8 LIMITS 
If Clause 8 limits apply externally, Congress faces two broad 
classes of constraints when it seeks to grant exclusive rights in expres-
sion.  First, Congress must respect limits on the sorts of rights it con-
 
206 Although not a tax, the Manufacturing Clause of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 601 
(2000), functioned in much the same way.  Prior to 1986, § 601 prohibited the importa-
tion of  “nondramatic literary material that is in the English language . . . unless . . . such 
material . . . [was] manufactured in the United States or Canada.”  Id. § 601(a)  In Au-
thor’s League of America, Inc. v. Oman, the Second Circuit rejected a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Manufacturing Clause.  790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986).  The court held that the 
statute, regardless of whether it promoted the progress of science, was justified under the 
Commerce Clause.  The Author’s League court implicitly recognized that the Manufactur-
ing Clause was beyond the scope of Clause 8 subject matter.  Section 601 did not grant 
exclusive rights in expression.  Instead, it regulated the importation of goods manufac-
tured abroad on an industry-wide basis.  Both the court and Congress understood that 
the Manufacturing Clause “protect[ed] . . . the domestic printing industry.”  Id. at 224.  It 
granted no exclusive rights to particular copyright holders.  Much like the preferential 
taxes, § 601 effected a regulation, not an exclusive rights regime.  Despite its codification 
in Title 17, the Manufacturing Clause was a commerce regulation from the outset. 
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fers; those rights must promote progress, expire in time, and vest in 
authors.  Second, Congress must adhere to limits on the types of 
works protected by exclusive rights; those works must be both original 
and written.  Taken together, these limits contribute to a constitu-
tionally grounded public domain. 
This Part applies both of these classes of Clause 8 limits to analyze 
the constitutionality of existing and proposed legislation.  After con-
sidering each class of limits in turn, this Part returns to the question 
that motivated this discussion of inter-clause conflict—the constitu-
tionality of the federal anti-bootlegging statutes.  After analyzing 
those statutes through the lens of external Clause 8 limits, this Part 
concludes by evaluating the Second Circuit’s effort to resolve this in-
ter-clause conflict in Martignon. 
A.  Limits on the Scope and Character of Exclusive Rights 
Three Clause 8 limits restrain the nature of the exclusive rights 
Congress may grant.  Exclusive rights in expressive works must offer 
protection for only limited times, and that protection must be 
granted to authors.  In addition, Congress has an independent obli-
gation to ensure that grants of exclusive rights in expression “pro-
mote the Progress of Science.”  Legislation that fails to conform to 
these limits, regardless of the power under which Congress claims to 
be acting, exceeds its constitutional authority. 
The requirement that exclusive rights in expression promote the 
progress of science poses the greatest practical difficulty in enforce-
ment.  Again, the dominant reading interprets this text as a preamble 
with no binding effect.  But even if courts reject this view in favor of 
the more supportable position that “promote the Progress” functions 
as a genuine limit on congressional authority,207 the precise contours 
of its mandate are not self-evident.  Determining whether legislation 
promotes the advancement of learning requires a forward-looking 
analysis of an act’s likely effects that is inherently speculative.  Per-
haps in recognition of the rather indeterminate nature of the com-
mand to “promote the Progress,” courts—even those that accept that 
“promote the Progress” functions as a limit208—have typically yielded 
to congressional judgment on the question of furthering the constitu-
 
207 See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1810–15. 
208 See, e.g., Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 150 (2005) (applying rational basis test 
to determine whether congressional diversion of patent fees for non-patent purposes was 
a valid measure aimed to “promote the Progress”). 
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tional goals of Clause 8.209  As a result, no clear metric for evaluating 
the promotion of progress has emerged.210  Given the inherent im-
precision of the inquiry and the Court’s resulting deference, robust 
enforcement of this limit is unlikely.  However, this limit could prove 
important in precluding Congress from indulging its more extreme 
impulses. 
Unlike “promote the Progress,” the limited times requirement has 
a clearly defined outer boundary.  As the Court acknowledged in El-
dred, if the limited times requirement is to have any meaning, it must 
at the very least prevent Congress from enacting a perpetual term of 
copyright protection.211  This limited term of protection is meant to 
ensure that copyrighted works eventually enter the public domain, 
where they can be freely copied, distributed, and adapted.212  But if 
“limited” simply means “not infinite,” the Constitution may not im-
pose any practical limit on the term of copyright protection.  A life 
plus 10,000-year copyright term, while not perpetual, would imperil 
rather than secure the public domain.  A reading of Clause 8 that 
permitted a term of such length would render “limited Times” nearly 
as meaningless as an interpretation that ignored it altogether. 
 
209 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the 
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”); Stewart v. Ab-
end, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“Th[e] evolution of the duration of copyright protection 
tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces . . . . [I]t is not our role to alter the deli-
cate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of 
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in or-
der to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”); Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress 
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy 
which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”). 
   Some early cases held that immoral or obscene works could not be protected under 
copyright on the basis that such works did not promote progress.  See generally, e.g., Barnes 
v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1903); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 
1867).  Although subsequent courts have not followed this practice, see Mitchell Bros. 
Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to deny 
copyright protection to material on the basis of alleged obscenity), these early cases sug-
gest that courts can define and enforce limits on the basis of “promote the Progress.” 
210 Professor Oliar has suggested as a starting point criterion that deems legislation unconsti-
tutional if “its marginal benefits, in terms of creativity and knowledge, are extremely out-
weighed by its marginal costs in terms of creativity and knowledge.”  Oliar, supra note 1, 
at 1840. 
211 537 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The express grant of a perpetual copyright 
would unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors’ exclusive rights 
be only ‘for limited Times.’”). 
212 See Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 374. 
  
1126 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 10:5 
 
But even accepting Eldred’s anemic reading of “limited times,” this 
requirement still places some meaningful constraints on Congress.  
External application of the durational limit means that Congress, by 
announcing its reliance on the Commerce Clause or by phrasing leg-
islation in a manner suggestive of a commercial regulation, cannot 
avoid adherence to the limited times requirement.  As even the 
staunchest supporters of term extension have realized, the limited 
times requirement imposes a limit that is not so easily circum-
vented.213  Although it would appear that Congress could easily com-
ply with the requirement that exclusive rights in expression last for 
some period short of eternity, as discussed infra, existing federal stat-
utes fail to satisfy even that forgiving standard.214 
In addition to containing a durational limit, exclusive rights 
granted by Congress in expressive works must be granted to the au-
thors of those works.  Whether Congress seeks to amend the Copy-
right Act, regulate commerce, or create sui generis intellectual prop-
erty protection, only authors are appropriate recipients of exclusive 
rights in expression. 
Of course, Clause 8 permits exclusive rights to fall into the hands 
of non-authors after they vest.  Authors remain free to transfer their 
rights to non-authors,215 and prior copyright acts allowed parties other 
than authors to renew existing copyrights in the event of the author’s 
death.216  In both of these instances, however, authors are the initial 
recipients of exclusive rights.  Under the current Act, copyrights can 
 
213 Congresswoman Mary Bono stated, with reference to her late husband, Rep. Sonny Bono: 
Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.  I am informed by 
staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. . . . As you know, there is 
also Jack Valenti’s proposal for term to last forever less one day.  Perhaps the 
Committee may look at that next Congress. 
  144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono). 
214  See infra Part IV.C.  
215 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000). 
216 Under all pre-1976 U.S. copyright acts, at the expiration of the original copyright term, 
the copyright holder could renew the copyright.  See R. Anthony Reese, Is the Public Do-
main Permanent?:  Congress’s Power To Grant Exclusive Rights in Unpublished Public Domain 
Works, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 531, 558 (2007).  As early as 1831, if the original copyright 
holder was deceased, the author’s spouse or children could exercise the renewal option.  
See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 34, 16 Stat. 
198, 202.  Subsequent acts permitted renewal by the beneficiaries of the author’s estate.  
The 1909 Act provided that if the author left no surviving spouse or child, the renewal 
term could vest in the author’s executor or next of kin.  See Copyright Act of 1909, Act of 
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.  This same rule applied to works pub-
lished before 1978 under the 1976 Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000). 
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be transferred, but initially vest in the author.217  And renewal terms 
granted to spouses and executors under pre-1976 regimes were con-
tingent on the initial copyright grants to authors and functioned as 
extensions of those preexisting rights.218 
The work-made-for-hire doctrine may likewise raise questions re-
lated to the vesting of copyrights in non-authors.  Copyright interests 
in works made for hire may vest in individuals and corporations who 
fall outside of our intuitive and perhaps romantic notions of author-
ship.  But copyright law recognizes that the term “author” should not 
be rigidly interpreted so as to exclude those who commission or di-
rect the creation of works of expression made for hire, since they can 
reasonably be considered the originator of those works.  An author, 
whether an individual or a corporation, need not lay pen to paper to 
create a work.  One who oversees and directs the creation of a work 
can claim responsibility for its creation and can serve as its author.219 
But if the term “author” is to remain meaningful, it must contain 
some limits.  Two grants of exclusive rights, one already implemented 
in the European Union and another under discussion at the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), provide examples of 
exclusive rights that likely cannot be squared with the Constitution’s 
insistence that exclusive rights in expression extend only to the origi-
nators or creators of that expression. 
The 1993 European Union Copyright Directive (“Directive”) pro-
vides for the granting of exclusive rights to the publishers of previ-
ously unpublished public domain works.220  Under legislation em-
 
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).  Perhaps more problematically, the original copyright term 
did not always vest in the author herself, but could instead initially vest in the author’s as-
signee.  Under pre-1976 regimes, an author could transfer her interest in a work after its 
creation, but prior to its publication.  Even when an assignee obtained the original copy-
right, the initial grant depended upon a right that originated with the author and was ex-
ercised only by one who stood in the author’s shoes as a result of the author’s decision to 
transfer that right. 
218 That extension, however, was unburdened by the assignments and licenses granted dur-
ing the original term, leading some courts to refer to the renewal term as a “new estate.”  
Reese, supra note 217, at 558; see also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 
F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951) (“A copyright renewal creates a new estate, and the few cases 
which have dealt with the subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests 
or licenses granted under the original copyright.”).  Nonetheless, a preexisting grant of 
rights to the author was a necessary condition for the existence of the renewal term. 
219 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “work made for hire”). 
220 Council Directive 93/98, art. 4, 1919 O.J. (L 290) 9, 11 (EC) (“Any person who, after the 
expiry of copyright protection, for the first time lawfully publishes or lawfully communi-
cates to the public a previously unpublished work, shall benefit from a protection equiva-
lent to the economic rights of the author.  The term of protection of such rights shall be 
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bodying the Directive, the first publisher to make a previously unpub-
lished public domain work available receives exclusive rights in that 
work for twenty-five years.221  Assuming Congress sought to enact simi-
lar legislation, it would be barred by the limits of Clause 8. 
Unlike a corporation that directs the creation of a work made for 
hire, a publisher who merely prints and distributes a long-extant un-
published work is not the creator or originator of that work.222  The 
EU publication right confers a right equivalent to a copyright on a 
party with no necessary connection to the author, aside from posses-
sion of a manuscript.  Whereas copyright renewals were granted to 
the author’s spouse or executor, the publication rights envisioned by 
the Directive provide exclusive rights to rank strangers from the au-
thor’s perspective.  While transfers and renewals under prior U.S. law 
can be read as consistent with the Constitution’s call for copyrights 
granted to authors, the copyright grave robbing permitted under the 
EU Directive cannot be squared with our Constitution. 
The most recent draft of the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of 
Broadcasting Organizations (“Broadcast Treaty”) offers another ex-
ample of potential legislation that, if adopted by Congress, would 
likely violate the limits of Clause 8.223  The Broadcast Treaty would ex-
tend to broadcasters and cablecasters a host of exclusive rights in 
their transmissions—rights of fixation, reproduction, distribution, re-
transmission, and communication to the public.224  Although broad-
casters originate the signal that carries the content they transmit, they 
are often not its authors.  But these rights are granted to broadcasters 
 
25 years from the time when the work was first lawfully published or lawfully communi-
cated to the public.”). 
221 See, e.g., Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 1996, S.I. 1996/2967, pt. II, ¶ 16(6) 
(U.K.) (granting a “publication right” for a twenty-five year duration to first publishers 
under United Kingdom law). 
222 Indeed, since the Framers were likely influenced by the Statute of Anne in crafting the 
contours of copyright in the United States, and the Statute of Anne was itself a rejection 
of the Stationers’ monopoly, reading “Authors” to include the publishers of existing un-
published works appears particularly inappropriate.  See Heald & Sherry, supra note 6 at 
1144-45 (noting the likely influence of the Statute of Anne and the Stationers’ Monopoly 
on the Framers). 
223 For a discussion of other ways in which the Broadcast Treaty may violate the Constitution, 
see generally Adam R. Tarosky, The Constitutionality of WIPO’s Broadcasting Treaty:  The Origi-
nality and Limited Times Requirements of the Copyright Clause, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16. 
224 See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on Copyright 
and Related Rights, Revised Draft Basic Proposal for the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broad-
casting Organizations, SCCR/15/2 (July 31, 2006), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
sccr/en/sccr_15/sccr_15_2.pdf. 
  
June 2008] PENUMBRAL PUBLIC DOMAIN 1129 
 
regardless of their roles in creating the transmitted content,225 permit-
ting exclusive rights in material created by others and, in some cases, 
not even protected by copyright.226  As a result, legislation creating 
the rights envisioned by the Broadcast Treaty227 would extend exclu-
sive rights in expression to non-authors in violation of the limits of 
Clause 8.228 
Clause 8 imposes three different restrictions on the rights Con-
gress can grant in expression.  Those limits restrain the purpose and 
effect of exclusive rights, the duration of those rights, and to whom 
they can be extended.  The next Section describes how Clause 8 lim-
its restrict the class of works that can be subject to such grants of ex-
clusive rights. 
 
225 Broadcasters could argue that the licensed transmission of television programming inter-
spersed with advertisements results in an independently copyrightable compilation or de-
rivative work entitling them to protection.  But to the extent that such a work was both 
fixed and original, it would require no new legislation and would be protected by existing 
copyright law in the United States. 
226 See, e.g., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, BRIEFING PAPER ON THE PROPOSED WIPO 
BROADCASTING TREATY 2 (June 18, 2007), http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ 
  broadcasting_treaty/EFF_wipo_briefing_paper_062007.pdf (noting the potential impact 
of the Broadcast Treaty on public domain works). 
227 The treaty power offers another potential alternative source of authority for the regula-
tion of exclusive rights in expressive works in a manner inconsistent within the limits of 
Clause 8.  See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority:  An (Inter) Na-
tionalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355 (2007).  Some argue 
that the treaty power is unrestrained by the limits of Clause 8.  See Caroline T. Nguyen, 
Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time?  Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations 
Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079 (2006).  A full treatment of potential 
conflicts with the treaty power is beyond the scope of this Article.  But it is worth noting 
that the limits of Clause 8 are equally superfluous whether they are ignored under the 
Commerce Clause or the treaty power.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (Black, J., 
plurality opinion) (“[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Con-
gress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the 
Constitution.”). 
228 Under current U.S. law, a broadcaster who is licensed to transmit a copyrighted work may 
file a copyright infringement suit against a cable or satellite provider that rebroadcasts 
that work without paying the statutory license for such a rebroadcast.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 111(b) (2000) (detailing the situations under which secondary transmissions may be ac-
tionable as infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501); see also id. § 501(c) (allowing broadcast 
stations to be treated as beneficial owners, even when a cable system rebroadcasts a par-
ticular work in the same local service area).  Unlike under the Broadcast Treaty, the right 
at issue, while asserted by the licensee, is a copyright granted to the author.  These provi-
sions do not enlarge the scope of the copyright grant, but merely permit the broadcaster 
to stand in the shoes of the copyright holder as a procedural matter. 
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B.  Limits on Protectable Works 
The limits of Clause 8 deny Congress the power to grant exclusive 
rights in two types of expressive works:  those that are unoriginal and 
those that are unwritten.  These two classes of works are not only un-
protectable under the Copyright Act and any revisions to it, but they 
are also beyond the scope of any other grant of legislative authority.  
Only expressive works that are both original and written are the 
proper subjects of federal grants of exclusive rights.  Taken together, 
the originality and writings requirements establish a class of works 
that lies outside the positive authority of Clause 8, but within its ex-
clusive domain and thus beyond the reach of other enumerated pow-
ers. 
Originality, the central limit on the scope of copyrightable subject 
matter, has been described as the “sine qua non” of the copyright 
grant,229 the “premise of copyright law,”230 and “the core question of 
copyrightability.”231  As the Court has recognized, although the thre-
sholds for originality under both the Constitution and the Copyright 
Act are minimal, those works that fail to satisfy it are ineligible for 
protection.232 
After Feist rejected the notion that unoriginal compilations of data 
are within the scope of the copyright power, legislators have repeat-
edly sought to provide protection for such works through other 
means.233  Proponents of such legislation appear to believe that by re-
 
229 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
230 Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981). 
231 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003). 
232 See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
233 See, e.g., H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2003) (prohibiting the misappropriation of da-
tabases); H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2003) (prohibiting the misappropriation of 
certain databases); H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (prohibiting the distribution 
of database duplicates); H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (prohibiting the misap-
propriation of collections of information); S. 2291, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998) (same).  
These efforts have faced sustained criticism.  See generally Benkler, supra note 1; Heald & 
Sherry, supra note 6, at 1176–79 (analyzing the constitutionality of regulating exchanges 
of information); Patry, supra note 6 at 394–97 (criticizing the Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act); Memorandum from William M. Treanor, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to the Associate White House 
Counsel, Constitutional Concerns Raised by the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (July 28, 
1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/righto.htm (noting that legislation granting 
exclusive rights to unoriginal data “would impermissibly infringe on an implicit limitation 
contained in the Intellectual Property Clause”).  For other commentary on the relation-
ship between constitutional interpretation of Congress’s enumerated powers and intellec-
tual property legislation, see generally Paul Bender, The Constitutionality of Proposed Federal 
Database Protection Legislation, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 143 (2002), Jane C. Ginsburg, No 
“Sweat”?  Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 
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fusing to extend copyright protection to unoriginal works Feist re-
moved those works from the domain of Clause 8 entirely, leaving 
them free to be regulated under the less restrictive authority of the 
Commerce Clause.  But far from freeing Congress from the con-
straints of the copyright power, the Court’s holding in Feist—coupled 
with the understanding of Clause 8 limits as external constraints on 
congressional authority generally—dictates that unoriginal compila-
tions of data are simply not the proper subject of federal grants of ex-
clusive rights.234  The Constitution mandates that, regardless of the 
will of Congress, unoriginal expressive works are permanently and 
inescapably within the public domain.235 
 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992), and Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Data-
bases Can Be Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159 (2002). 
234 As a consequence of the public’s “negative right” to use unoriginal works, Professor Patry 
likewise concludes that Congress may not, through the exercise of the commerce power, 
grant exclusive rights in unoriginal compilations of data.  See Patry, supra note 6, at 394–
97.  This conclusion is justified, as far as it goes.  But while Patry’s negative right preserves 
the originality requirement in the face of the expanded commerce power, it fails to do 
the same for the writings requirement. 
235 Trademark protection, which the Court rejected as an improper exercise of Clause 8 au-
thority, finds justification in Congress’s commerce power.  See generally Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82 (1879) (invalidating statutes which authorized the indictment of persons who 
counterfeited trademarked material).  Although the Lanham Act extends protection to 
marks regardless of their originality, the constitutionality of its prohibitions against in-
fringement, false designation, and false description is not in doubt.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 
& 1125(a) (2000).  Traditional trademark protection functions to identify the source or 
origin of products in the marketplace in order to enable consumers to make informed 
decisions.  As the Court has recognized, trademark law is concerned with identifying the 
source of a physical product, not the author of any expressive content that product might 
contain.  See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 
(2003) (“[A]s used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in our view incapa-
ble of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that 
‘goods’ embody or contain.”).  In order to avoid conflicts with the exclusive subject mat-
ter of copyright law, the Court has recognized that trademark protection cannot extend 
to the communicative or expressive aspects of goods and services.  See id. at 33; see also 
Christopher Sprigman, Indirect Enforcement of the Intellectual Property Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 565, 585 (2007) (characterizing Dastar as an indirect external application of 
Clause 8 limits).  Although a trademark can identify the manufacturer of a videotape, the 
mark does not necessarily indicate the author of the “intellectual content that it conveys.”  
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.  For the purposes of trademark law, a mark functions as an indica-
tor of source, even if the mark itself is separately eligible for copyright or patent protec-
tion.  Because the communicative aspects of works remain within the sole province of 
Clause 8, federal trademark law can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.  Although 
beyond the scope of this Article, trademark dilution, because it grants exclusive rights in 
unoriginal works not tethered to source indication, raises more difficult constitutional 
questions.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (providing remedies for dilution of famous 
marks in the absence of consumer confusion, false designation, or false description). 
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Just as unprotectable unoriginal works are within Clause 8’s exclu-
sive zone of control, unwritten works also fall within the ambit of 
Clause 8 but outside of its positive authority.  Because Congress is 
permitted to grant exclusive rights only in writings,236 unwritten ex-
pressive works fall into a no-man’s land of federal grants of exclusive 
rights; they cannot receive protection pursuant to Clause 8, but are 
simultaneously beyond the reach of other enumerated powers.237 
An unwritten work of expression is not so fundamentally divorced 
from the subject matter of Clause 8 to justify immunity from its limits.  
Unwritten works are no farther from the core concerns of the copy-
right power than unoriginal compilations of data.  Indeed, to the ex-
tent unwritten works exhibit originality, the key characteristic of co-
pyrightability, they are closer to copyright’s central concerns.  Both 
originality and writings are limits on the positive authority granted to 
Congress under Clause 8 and can lay equal claim to external applica-
tion.  If the basis for external application of these limits is the risk of 
superfluity, there is no reason to treat one as an enforceable limit on 
congressional power, while viewing Congress’s violation of the other 
as permission to escape the restrictions imposed by Clause 8. 
Admittedly, the policy rationale for denying Congress the ability 
to grant exclusive rights in unwritten works may not be as immedi-
ately apparent as the concerns that militate against protections for 
unoriginal compilations of data.  Opposition to protection for data is 
rooted in the threat to the free flow of information posed by monop-
oly rights in facts.238  The harm that would flow from protection for 
unwritten works is perhaps less vividly imagined, in part because 
there have been fewer occasions to consider it. 
Unwritten works could take at least two forms—ideas, on the one 
hand, and performances and utterances, on the other.  The term 
“ideas,” in this context, does not refer to the abstractions or concep-
tual generalities referred to by the idea/expression distinction.  In-
 
236 See supra Part III.A.4. 
237 The limits of Clause 8 apply to limit the power of the federal government; they do not, on 
their own, preclude the states from enacting copyright-like protections against the unau-
thorized recording of live performances.  More than twenty states provide such protec-
tion.  See Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the Federal An-
ti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 327, 332 
n.29 (2000) (collecting statutes).  States could likewise make use of the right of publicity 
to protect performers from unauthorized commercial exploitation of live performances.  
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that there 
was no constitutional bar to a state law requiring compensation to a performer for an un-
authorized broadcast of his performance). 
238 See Benkler, supra note 6, at 558–69. 
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stead, “ideas” here refers to an author’s internal, unvoiced, and un-
written conceptions.  These ideas may be general in nature, or they 
may be so detailed that, if embodied in some tangible form, they 
would qualify as copyrightable expression.  But even those creations 
lack the permanence necessary for copyright protection if they are 
not reduced to a tangible medium.  Likewise, a performance or ut-
terance, even if voiced publicly, fails to satisfy the writings require-
ment unless embodied in some nonfleeting form. 
The refusal to extend copyright protection to these unwritten 
works serves two related functions.  The first is evidentiary.  By requir-
ing that any work protected by copyright be committed to tangible 
form, the Constitution avoids problems of proof that would otherwise 
stymie enforcement efforts.239  If unwritten works were protected, 
“copyright law would forever be mired in disputes over the definition 
and boundaries of the works claiming copyright protection.”240  Every 
successful film or novel could face claims that it infringed upon ex-
clusive rights in unwritten works, the precise content of which would 
be known only to few, if any, aside from their authors.  These prob-
lems of proof and the resulting uncertainty could create unreason-
able risks that would deter investment in creative works. 
Second, the writings requirement helps to ensure that the copy-
right system remains faithful to its constitutional directive.  Extending 
protection only to written works encourages authors to put their 
ideas on paper, where they can best be preserved, copied, and even-
tually disseminated to the public.  To the extent the writings re-
quirement ensures that expressive works are captured in lasting re-
producible forms, that requirement furthers the goals of enriching 
the public domain and promoting progress.  Granting protection to 
unwritten works could undermine those aims.  With lessened incen-
tives to fix their works, some authors may deny posterity their value.241 
Relatedly, grants of exclusive rights in unwritten works could in-
terfere with public discussion and the exchange of information.  If 
 
239 See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 730–34 (2003) 
(discussing the fixation requirement as a rule of evidence). 
240 Gregory S. Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation:  A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational Performers, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1400 (1997); see also Lichtman, supra note 240, at 730–34; Russ 
VerSteeg, Jurimetric Copyright:  Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
125, 132 (1994) (discussing the practical problems that the writings requirement ad-
dresses). 
241 See, e.g., Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause:  Halting the 
Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661, 
681 (2002) (noting that the fixation requirement is critical to the bargain between society 
and copyright holders). 
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copyright extended to unfixed expression, “every utterance” could be 
protected.242  Retelling an anecdote overheard in the neighborhood 
bar or taking notes on a debate at city hall could give rise to claims of 
infringement.  Copyright protection for unwritten works could trans-
form every public statement or private conversation into a potentially 
protectable work.  Without a written record of the particular expres-
sion at issue, the effect of such protection on public discourse could 
be dramatic. 
The Framers, it seems, were justified in limiting the scope of copy-
rightable subject matter to original writings.  Permitting Congress to 
draft legislation that grants exclusive rights in works of expression 
that fall within the penumbral public domain would give rise to out-
comes antithetical to the stated purpose of Clause 8.  Nonetheless, at 
least one existing piece of federal legislation grants exclusive rights in 
unwritten expression, and does so without a durational limit. 
C.  The Unconstitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
The civil anti-bootlegging statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, treats as a 
copyright infringer any person who “without the consent of the per-
former” fixes the sounds of a live musical performance or repro-
duces, transmits, distributes, sells, rents, or otherwise traffics in such a 
recording.243  Likewise, its counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, imposes 
criminal sanctions of up to ten years of imprisonment on those who 
engage in that proscribed conduct “knowingly and for purposes of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain.”244   
As a matter of policy, Congress’s wisdom in enacting these statutes 
is doubtful.  Although they impose the penalties for copyright in-
fringement, the anti-bootlegging statutes do not incorporate speech-
protective defenses to infringement, including fair use.245  But more 
 
242 Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (W.D. Va. 1981) (rejecting a 
claim to common-law copyright protection for spoken expression); see also Wendy J. Gor-
don, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and En-
couragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1382 (1989) (discussing the role of the fixation 
requirement in defining the bounds of the protected expression). 
243 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).  To refer to such recordings as “fixed” is incorrect.  Under 
the definition of “fixed” provided by the Copyright Act, a work is fixed only if embodied 
in a tangible medium of expression “by or under the authority of the author.”  Id. § 101.  
By definition, these recordings, even though sufficiently tangible, are not made with the 
authority of the author, unless of course, the recordist is considered the author.  As that 
was clearly not the intention of Congress, the use of this term is mistaken. 
244 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000). 
245 The First Amendment presents an independent basis for finding the anti-bootlegging 
statutes unconstitutional.  To the extent the statutes are copyright laws, they alter the tra-
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fundamentally, these statutes violate the external limits of Clause 8 by 
conferring perpetual rights to unprotectable works. 
In order for the anti-bootlegging statutes to fall within the exclu-
sive scope of Clause 8, they must confer exclusive rights in expres-
sion.  The subject matter regulated by these statutes, live musical per-
formances and recordings thereof, can safely be assumed to be 
expressive.  Indeed, most, if not all, would satisfy the originality re-
quirement of Clause 8.  But do the statutes confer exclusive rights? 
This question is perhaps best answered by comparing the rights 
effectively created by the anti-bootlegging statutes to those granted by 
the Copyright Act.  In part, § 106 confers to copyright holders exclu-
sive rights to reproduce, distribute, sell, rent, and publicly perform 
their works.246  Under the copyright grant, only the copyright holder 
is permitted to engage in these activities or to authorize others to do 
so.247  One who undertakes any of these activities without the permis-
sion of the copyright holder, absent some applicable defense, is an 
infringer. 
Liability under the anti-bootlegging statutes is likewise premised 
on taking action “without the consent of the performer.”248  Those ac-
tions—in addition to recording a live performance—include repro-
ducing, distributing, selling, renting, and transmitting.249  By impos-
ing civil and criminal liability on one who takes such action without 
the authorization of the performer, the anti-bootlegging statutes cre-
ate exclusive rights remarkably similar to those granted by § 106. 
 
ditional contours of copyright’s internal speech-protective safeguards, including fair use, 
and are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 
(2003) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000) (first alteration in original)); see also Golan v. Gonzales, 
501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding a challenge to § 514 of the URAA for 
analysis under the First Amendment).  To the extent they are commerce legislation, the 
anti-bootlegging statutes are subject to traditional First Amendment analysis.  As argued 
by amici in Martignon, the statutes are both overbroad and vague.  See Brief for Twenty-
Nine Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendant-Appellee at 24–30, United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(No. 04-5649) (asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A merits heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny).  In Martignon, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to 
consider the First Amendment challenge.  See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 153. 
246 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
247 See id. (granting “exclusive rights . . . to do and to authorize” various activities); id. § 501 
(defining copyright infringement and remedies). 
248 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (defining unauthorized acts as occurring “without the con-
sent of the performer or performers involved”); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000). 
249 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000). 
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If the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within the scope of Clause 8 by 
virtue of granting exclusive rights in expression, are the statutes 
proper exercises of Clause 8 authority or instead located within the 
penumbra defined by its limits?  The first exclusive right granted to 
performers under the anti-bootlegging statutes is the right to record 
a live performance, or to authorize others to do so.  The object of this 
right to initially record a performance—because it necessarily pre-
cedes the creation of the recording—is the live performance itself.  
But since these live performances are ephemeral, they cannot satisfy 
the writings requirement of Clause 8. 
Courts and Congress have construed the term “Writings” liber-
ally.250  In order to account for the inevitability of new methods of re-
ducing the creativity of authors to tangible form, the Court has 
adopted a broad and flexible understanding of the term that em-
braces “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellec-
tual . . . labor.”251  But no court has broadened the definition of “Writ-
ings” to include works not embodied in some tangible form.  And 
Congress has never extended the scope of copyrightable works to in-
clude unfixed ephemeral performances.  Any reading of the term 
“Writings” that embraces live performances—as opposed to re-
cordings of them—cannot be squared with precedent.252  To do so 
would strip “Writings” of any meaning by eliminating its sole estab-
lished limit.  Since the live performances protected by the anti-
bootlegging statutes are not writings, they cannot be the proper sub-
ject of federal grants of exclusive rights, and the exclusive right to re-
cord is unconstitutional. 
Aside from conferring exclusive rights in unwritten live perform-
ances, the anti-bootlegging statutes also provide performers with per-
petual exclusive rights over recordings of those performances—
recordings that qualify as original, written expression well within the 
exclusive province of Clause 8.  Because these rights are perpetual, 
the statutes run afoul of the limited times requirement of Clause 8. 
Both statutes grant performers the exclusive right to authorize the 
“reproduc[tion of] copies or phonorecords . . . from an unauthorized 
 
250 See supra Part III.A.4. 
251 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
252 See David Nimmer, Essay, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995) (“[N]o 
respectable interpretation of the word ‘Writings’ embraces an untaped performance of 
someone singing at Carnegie Hall.”).  But see 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 15.6.1 (2d ed. 2005)(“[P]erformances subject to [federal anti-bootlegging] 
protection are ‘writings’ in the constitutional sense . . . .”). 
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fixation.”253  Likewise, both grant the performer the exclusive right to 
authorize distribution and sale of “any copy or phonorecord” of an 
unauthorized recording.254  These copies, as the “physical render-
ing[s] of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,” qualify 
as writings under Clause 8.255  Because recordings of performances 
are within the reach of Clause 8,256 they are likewise subject to its lim-
its, regardless of the power under which Congress claims to act. 
The recordings of musical performances protected from unau-
thorized reproduction under the anti-bootlegging statute differ in 
only one respect from those protected under traditional copyright 
law.  Copyrighted sound recordings are initially created with the per-
former’s authorization; those subject to the perpetual exclusive rights 
granted by the anti-bootlegging statute are recorded without authori-
zation.  This distinction could prove decisive for a number of ques-
tions under a constitutionally legitimate statutory regime.  It could 
determine whether a copyright subsists in a work, who may claim it, 
or whether an infringement has occurred.  But this distinction does 
not establish a line that divides legislation enacted pursuant to Clause 
8 and constrained by its limits from legislation justified under the 
Commerce Clause and thereby immune from those limits. 
Congress may well be capable of crafting legislation that confers 
to performers exclusive rights in recordings of their performances,257 
 
253 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(1). 
254 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3). 
255 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 
657, 664 (2d. Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting) (asserting that a writing is a “physical ob-
ject that can be made to reproduce”). 
256 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562. 
257 The durational problem raised by the anti-bootlegging statutes could be resolved fairly 
easily by inserting a time limit on the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, and trans-
mit unauthorized recordings of live performances.  TRIPS, in fact, required only fifty 
years of protection.  See supra note 10. 
   The more difficult issue in attempting to provide constitutionally authorized protec-
tions for live performances is that those performances themselves are not an appropriate 
subject of exclusive rights under Clause 8.  A recording of a performance can be pro-
tected, but not the performance itself.  One potential solution is to expand the Copyright 
Act’s simultaneous fixation provision to include untransmitted live performances that are 
fixed under the authority of the performer at the time of the performance.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ 
for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its 
transmission.”).  Under this approach, an unauthorized recording of a simultaneously 
fixed live performance would be an infringement under traditional copyright doctrine in 
much the same way a recording of a televised live sports event is today.  See, e.g., Posting of 
Fred von Lohmann to The Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005
/05/constitutionality-of-bootleg-statute.html (May 18, 2005, 13:29 EST) (“In considering 
the issue of bootlegging . . . I’ve always wondered why Congress didn’t simply extend the 
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but it must do so within the confines of Clause 8.  But because the 
Constitution “clearly precludes” perpetual grants of exclusive rights 
in copyrightable subject matter,258 the failure to include a durational 
limit in the anti-bootlegging statute—to the extent the objects of its 
exclusive rights are writings—proves its fatal flaw. 
D.  The Second Circuit’s Misreading of § 2319A 
The district court in Martignon recognized the dual constitutional 
infirmities of the anti-bootlegging statute; it granted perpetual rights, 
and it granted those rights in unwritten performances.259 
On appeal, the United States agreed that § 2319A conferred rights 
in non-writings, but it argued that by doing so, the statute essentially 
removed itself from the sphere of Clause 8 power and into legislative 
terrain governed by the commerce power.  Martignon and his sup-
porters, on the other hand, maintained that by protecting unwritten 
works, § 2319A did not escape the limits of Clause 8, but simply vio-
lated them.  The significance of protection for non-writings looked to 
be the determinative issue on appeal.  But when the Second Circuit 
issued its opinion, some two years after it heard the case, it ignored 
this central question.  Instead, the court held that because § 2319A is 
 
‘simultaneous fixation’ doctrine, 17 U.S.C. 101 ([definition] of ‘fixed’), so that perform-
ers who wanted full copyright protections against bootleggers could simply record their 
performances.  Why not eliminate the ‘transmit’ requirement from the ‘simultaneous fix-
ation’ definition, and delete the strange ‘prior notice’ requirements of 17 U.S.C. 411(b)?  
Then performers would get the full arsenal of copyright remedies for the full copyright 
term against any bootleggers, simply by recording their performances on a handheld re-
corder.”).  But this approach, much like the anti-bootlegging statutes, impermissibly ex-
tends exclusive rights to a performance that is not a writing.  The simultaneous fixation 
approach at least does so by creating the legal fiction that the performance is fixed, but it 
nonetheless confers rights in a nonwriting. 
   A better approach would deem live performers the holders of a copyright in any un-
authorized recording of their performances.  Once the recording has been made, per-
formers could assert the typical panoply of § 106 rights against infringers.  They could 
not, however, prevent the initial creation of the recording.  But to the extent this is 
viewed as a shortcoming, it is one rooted in limits imposed by the Constitution.  This ap-
proach would require a change to the statutory definition of “fixed” works.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent 
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a pe-
riod of more than transitory duration.”). 
258 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 n.16 (2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 11 (2d 
Sess. 1996)); accord Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 
(2003) (noting that Congress may not create “a species of perpetual . . . copyright”). 
259  See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
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not a copyright law, the limits of Clause 8 were irrelevant to the ques-
tion of its constitutionality.260 
In many respects, the Second Circuit’s analysis in Martignon serves 
as a model for courts facing inter-clause conflicts.  After considering 
the relevant Supreme Court precedent, the court recognized that 
some limits on enumerated powers do constrain Congress when it 
seeks to act pursuant to an independent grant of authority.  The 
court rightly understood that those limits apply whenever the legisla-
tion in question is an exercise of power over the core subject matter 
of that grant.  According to the court, Commerce Clause legislation 
transgresses the limits of Clause 8 if “(1) the law [Congress] enacts is 
an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause 
and (2) the resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the 
Copyright Clause.”261 
The next step in the Second Circuit’s analysis was to determine 
“whether Section 2319A is a copyright law in the sense that RITA was 
a bankruptcy law.”262  If so, § 2319A, falls within the purview of Clause 
8 and is bound by its limits.  In the court’s words, “in order to dem-
onstrate unconstitutionality, Martignon must establish that Section 
2319A is a copyright law and not just that it is copyright-like.”263 
But the Second Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the district 
court’s use of the term “copyright-like.”  That term has drawn unwar-
ranted criticism from commentators as well.264  Although undoubtedly 
imprecise and perhaps unartful, the court’s use of the term “copy-
right-like” roughly equates to the notion of the Clause 8 penumbra 
described above.  In asking whether § 2319A served as a copyright law 
or a commercial regulation, the district court asked, in essence, 
whether the limits of Clause 8 govern Congress’s power to enact the 
statute.  By classifying § 2319A as copyright-like rather than a copy-
right law, the court recognized that § 2319A fell within the reach of 
Clause 8 limits, but outside of its positive authority.  As used by the 
 
260 See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007). 
261 Id. at 149. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 150. 
264 See Symposium, Panel III:  United States v. Martignon—Case in Controversy, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223, 1234 (statement of William Patry) (“The idea that 
[§ 2319A] could be ‘copyright-like’ I don’t quite get either.  You are pregnant or you are 
not pregnant.  Either it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a Copyright Clause.  It can’t be 
‘copyright-like.’”).  But see Patry, supra note 6, at 367 n.50 (“By ‘copyright-like,’ I mean a 
property right to prevent acts equivalent to those granted under the Copyright Act, such 
as the right to prevent an unlicensed reproduction of a substantial portion of an unorigi-
nal database.”). 
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district court, “copyright-like” referred to statutes that—while im-
permissible under Clause 8—are nonetheless within the scope of its 
exclusive control. 
Aside from this semantic confusion, the Second Circuit rightly dis-
tilled the essence of Congress’s Clause 8 authority.  Relying on the 
term “secure” in Clause 8, the court suggested that copyright laws, as 
their defining characteristic, “create, bestow, or allocate property 
rights in expression.”265  This definition of the core function of the 
copyright power closely resembles the explanation offered above.266  
According to the Second Circuit, the limits of Clause 8 preclude 
Congress from acting under the Commerce Clause any time it would 
confer exclusive rights in expression in a manner inconsistent with 
Clause 8 limits.  This holding, taken in isolation, is a victory for pro-
ponents of external application of Clause 8 limits. 
Had the Second Circuit faithfully applied this test to § 2319A, it 
would have concluded that the statute was, indeed, a copyright law—
and an unconstitutional one at that.  Instead, the court offered three 
rationales that it believed distinguished § 2319A from true copyright 
laws.  None of these rationales provide a reasonable basis for the 
court’s conclusion that § 2319A does not “allocate property rights in 
expression.”267 
First, the court reasoned that because § 2319A imposes a criminal 
sanction, it does not function to bestow exclusive rights on perform-
ers.268  According to the court, much like the law of criminal trespass, 
§ 2319A “does not grant the performer the right to exclude others”;269 
it merely “creates a power in the government to protect the interest 
of performers from commercial predations.”270  The court’s reasoning 
here conflated the existence or creation of a right with the mecha-
nism by which that right is enforced.  Section 2319A does, of course, 
provide the government with authority to prosecute those who violate 
the statute, but it simultaneously establishes a protectable interest in 
the performer whose work is the subject of the statute’s prohibitions.  
Whether achieved through criminal or civil sanctions, the effect of 
the anti-bootlegging statutes is the same:  performers and performers 
alone are permitted to engage in, or permit others to engage in, the 
 
265 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152. 
266 See supra Part III.B. 
267 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152. 
268 Id. at 151. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
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recording of live performances and the reproduction and distribu-
tion of copies of those recordings.  The fact that some state action is 
required to enforce the exclusive rights conferred by § 2319A does 
not distinguish them from the rights created by § 106 of the Copy-
right Act, or from common law property rights for that matter.271 
Aside from misunderstanding the effect of the statute, the court’s 
analysis leads to two problematic results.  First, since § 1101 creates a 
civil cause of action, the court’s primary basis for deeming § 2319A a 
commerce regulation does not apply.  This suggests, rather improba-
bly, that the two anti-bootlegging statutes, which regulate the same 
material through nearly identical prohibitions, were enacted pursu-
ant to two different grants of authority.  Moreover, it raises the possi-
bility that one is constitutional while the other is not.  Such a conclu-
sion should have led the court to reconsider its reasoning. 
Second, if enforcing grants of exclusive rights through criminal 
sanctions is sufficient to render a statute a non-copyright law, the 
long-standing criminal copyright provisions turn out not to be copy-
right laws either.  Criminal copyright enforcement, which has been a 
component of the copyright code since the nineteenth century,272 
would owe no allegiance to Clause 8 under the Second Circuit’s rea-
soning.  Indeed the court admitted that, under its reasoning, Con-
gress could impose criminal sanctions for the reproduction of public 
domain works without running afoul of the Constitution.273  Here the 
court bordered on pronouncing its own logic a reductio ad absurdum. 
The court relied on two additional justifications for its conclusion 
that § 2319A does not serve as a copyright law.  Both of these consid-
erations, because they compare the statute with the current Copy-
right Act rather than the scope of the copyright power, fail to further 
the relevant inquiry.  The court noted that the Copyright Act affords 
authors “an extensive bundle of rights.”274  By contrast, according to 
the court, § 2319A, provides only “one right—the right to allow the 
fixation of his or her performance.”275  Aside from mischaracterizing 
 
271 See Shelby D. Green, Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV. 245, 
299–300 (2003) (“‘Property’ . . . . bestows on an owner a form of sovereignty over others, 
because the sovereign state stands behind the owner’s assertion of right.  Individual 
property rights thus depend on state power and when the state recognizes and enforces 
one person’s property right, it simultaneously denies property rights in others.”). 
272 The first criminal provision in our copyright laws was a misdemeanor penalty added in 
1897 for unlawful performances and representations of copyrighted dramatic and musi-
cal compositions.  Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481. 
273 See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152 n.7. 
274 Id. at 151. 
275 Id. 
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the statute, which provides the performer with a bundle of rights 
nearly identical to those conferred on copyright holders,276 this dis-
tinction reveals little about whether § 2319A falls within the purview 
of Clause 8.  The current bundle of rights that constitute a copyright 
are a matter of congressional policy-making and industry lobbying;277 
they are not a reflection of the constitutional scope of the copyright 
power.  As history demonstrates, Congress has significantly and re-
peatedly altered the rights within this bundle.278  Doing so does not 
alter the constitutional source of its authority. 
The court similarly mistook the current Copyright Act as the 
proper metric for its constitutional analysis when it suggested that 
§ 2319A was not a copyright law because it did not permit the transfer 
of the exclusive rights it confers.279  Again, while it is true that the 
Copyright Act does permit copyright holders to assign or transfer 
their interests,280 no constitutional mandate requires such a provision.  
A copyright law without an assignment provision is nonetheless a 
copyright law.  If Congress, in its wisdom, chose to prevent copyright 
holders from transferring their rights, Clause 8 would pose no bar-
rier. 
The Second Circuit rightly understood that limits within particu-
lar enumerated powers can impose genuine external constraints on 
congressional authority.  It also recognized that the limits of Clause 8 
apply any time Congress seeks to grant exclusive rights in expression.  
But by focusing on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Copyright 
Act rather than the scope of the copyright power, the court incor-
rectly held that § 2319A was beyond the scope of Clause 8 and its lim-
its.  In the end, the Second Circuit failed to articulate a single rea-
 
276 See supra Part IV.C. 
277 See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1685 (1999) (describing the 
crafting of copyright legislation as a “series of contract negotiations” between interest 
groups); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. 
REV. 275, 314–15 (1989) (arguing that the copyright legislative process is largely deter-
mined by industry lobbying). 
278 The Copyright Act of 1790 Act, for example, granted exclusive rights “to print, reprint, 
publish, or vend.”  Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.  The Copyright Act of 
1909 granted rights to translate, deliver, and perform.  Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 
§ 1(b)–(d), 35 Stat. 1075.  The Copyright Act of 1976 Act replaced these earlier rights en-
tirely with a new set of rights, and surely did so without disturbing the constitutional 
source of Congress’s authority to confer copyrights.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (securing 
copyright owners the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, per-
form publicly, and display publicly). 
279 See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151. 
280 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 201–205 (2000); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 
ch. 320, § 27. 
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soned basis for insisting that § 2319A is not a copyright law in the 
constitutional sense.  Despite the Second Circuit’s attempt to salvage 
the statute, there can be little doubt that § 2319A, like its civil coun-
terpart, is a copyright law in the same way RITA was a bankruptcy law.  
Since the anti-bootlegging statutes are within the exclusive purview of 
Clause 8 authority, their failure to impose a durational limit and their 
extension of exclusive rights in unwritten expression, under the Sec-
ond Circuit’s own test, render them unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
If the limits of Clause 8 are to retain any relevance in interpreting 
the scope of Congress’s legislative powers in the face of the modern 
Commerce Clause, those limits must be applied externally to pre-
clude legislation that invades the penumbral public domain.  To per-
mit Congress to grant exclusive rights in perpetuity, or to non-
authors, or in unoriginal and unwritten works would not just allow 
Congress to reinterpret the Constitution, but to rewrite it. 
The recognition that Clause 8 limits restrain Congress any time it 
attempts to grant exclusive rights in expression reveals a public do-
main that is resilient to forces that threaten other, more vulnerable 
aspects of public domains.  The penumbral public domain, defined 
by the limits of Clause 8, is not subject to congressional whims,281 and 
it is less susceptible to unpredictable judicial decision making.282  Nor 
must it rely on private ordering.283  Short of a constitutional amend-
 
281 The existence of formal requirements necessary for copyright protection and the conse-
quences of failure to comply with such formalities offer one example of the impact of leg-
islative decision-making on the public domain.  See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, January 1, 
2003:  The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain and Its International Implications, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 692–93 (2006) (describing implications of failure to com-
ply with copyright formalities).  The constitutional public domain is also more resilient to 
legislative extension of the copyright term.  See Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copy-
right Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 210–11, 218–20 (2002) (describ-
ing Congress’s consideration of the public domain in extending the term of copyright 
protection). 
282 The fair use defense owes its origins and developments to  judicial interpretation, even 
though it was statutorily recognized by the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  Al-
though fair use operates as an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, it falls with-
in some more expansive readings of the public domain.  See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air 
to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 354, 361–62 (1999) (proposing a definition of the public domain that incorporates 
fair uses). 
283 Private licensing arrangements like those facilitated by Creative Commons licenses and 
the General Public License (“GPL”) contribute to some conceptions of the public do-
main by permitting the public to make specified uses of copyrighted works without seek-
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ment, this public domain is designed to weather the tides of shifting 
legislative agendas, judicial policy, and industry practice. 
But the penumbral public domain defined by the limits of Clause 
8 is only part of the broader constitutional public domain.  The First 
Amendment imposes another set of constraints that restricts the ex-
ercise of Congress’s copyright power.  Two copyright doctrines, the 
fair use defense and the idea/expression distinction, function to rec-
oncile copyright law with the First Amendment.  Grants of exclusive 
rights in expression that fail to respect these “traditional contours” of 
copyright law may very well run afoul of the Constitution.284  Ideas 
and fair uses, then, also fall within a public domain defined by consti-
tutional constraints. 
Public domains, however, are defined not only by their content, 
but by the freedoms they provide the public.285  The freedoms offered 
by the penumbral public domain, although comparatively immune 
from interference, are limited in a number of important respects.  
Frequently, the “public domain” refers to a class of material free of 
intellectual property rights.286  The works within the penumbral pub-
lic domain are free of federal grants of exclusive rights, but they are 
not necessarily free from intellectual property rights altogether.  Un-
authorized recordings of live performances, for example, can be re-
gulated through targeted state legislation or more general state rights 
of publicity.  Regardless of whether these state regulations are, strictly 
speaking, intellectual property rights, they impose many of the same 
restrictions on the public’s freedom.  Likewise, unoriginal compila-
tions of data, even though beyond the scope of congressional author-
ity, could be subject to state trade secrecy protection.  State contract 
law, of course, could further supplement these state law regimes by 
enforcing private restrictions on both performances and compila-
tions of data. 
The “public domain” may also denote public accessibility.287  Even 
if free of intellectual property rights, works are more valuable to the 
public if they can be viewed or otherwise utilized.  Works within the 
penumbral public domain occupy the full spectrum of accessibility.  
Some, like private performances and trade-secret data, are highly in-
 
ing permission from the copyright holder.  See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 800–02 (ex-
plaining how GPL and Creative Commons could be alternatives to traditional intellectual 
property rules). 
284 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
285 See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 816–19. 
286 See  id.  at 791. 
287 See  id.  at 798–99. 
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accessible.  Other performances, like the typical concert protected by 
the anti-bootlegging statutes, are restricted by an admission fee, and 
perhaps contractual terms, but otherwise open to all.  Still other per-
formances are truly public in the sense that no restrictions on access 
are imposed. 
The penumbral public domain, given its susceptibility to restric-
tions imposed by state law and the potential for inaccessibility, is by 
no means the most robust public domain we can imagine or to which 
we should aspire.  But the works within this public domain are far 
freer under a reading of the Constitution that enforces the limits of 
Clause 8 than one that permits the Commerce Clause free reign over 
the subject matter of Congress’s copyright power.  Perhaps more im-
portantly, the penumbral public domain, and the broader constitu-
tional public domain of which it is a component, establishes a floor 
on the contents of the public domain and the freedoms it provides.  
Regardless of what the Framers believed the public domain should 
include, the constitutional public domain represents what it must in-
clude.  Any robust public domain we construct depends, in part, on 
this foundation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
